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An Investigation of the Determinants of the Relative 
Size of the Administrative Component in 
National and International Labor Unions 
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David Allen Gray, B.B.A., University of Iowa 
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Directed by: Professor Max S. Wortman, Jr. 
The research question of this study was to determine how the 
variables of organization size and complexity were linked to the 
relative size of the administrative component in a multi-level 
organizational system, national and international labor unions. 
From an analysis of the literature bearing on this question, the 
following general hypotheses were formulated for testing: 
(1) The relative size of the administrative component decreases 
proportionately as the size of the organization increases. 
(2) The relative size of the administrative component increases 
proportionately as organization complexity increases. 
(3) As the complexity of the organization increases, the size 
of the organization increases at a proportionate rate. 
(4) The interaction effect of complexity with size decreases 
the relative size of the administrative component as organization 
size increases. 
A number of operational definitions of organization size and 
complexity were developed and used to enumerate several working 
v 
hypotheses for each general hypothesis. To test these working 
statements, a sample of 30 labor unions was surveyed. Union 
presidents, secretary-treasurers, research and education directors 
were asked a series of questions designed to elicit information 
concerning union size, administrative composition and size, structural 
differentiation, occupational and industrial distribution of the 
membership, and the complexity of the collective bargaining process. 
The data gathered were continuous in form which permitted the use of 
regression and correlation analysis for investigating the 
relationships among the variables. 
In testing the working hypotheses of the first, second, and 
fourth general hypotheses, the dependent variable (relative 
administrative size) was decomposed according to organization level 
(central union headquarters and regional office) and administrative 
category (managers and administrators, professional staff experts, 
organizers and representatives, and clerical workers). The data 
analysis yielded partial support for the first and fourth general 
hypotheses and no support for the second hypothesis. The relationship 
between union size and relative administrative size for several 
working statements was negative and formed a downward sloping curve 
which eventually leveled off. Only one of the many interaction 
equations of the fourth general hypothesis produced a significant 
interaction term; the combined effect of the number of locals 
(complexity) and the number of union members (size) on the central 
headquarters managerial ratio (relative managerial size) produced a 
vi 
rapidly declining curve which flattened out at a relatively low 
managerial ratio. 
The analysis of the second general hypothesis yielded 
inconsistent findings. Different measures of organization complexity 
were linked with various measures of relative administrative size 
in contrasting ways. The managerial ratio declined with increasing 
structural differentiation and increased with greater centralization 
(complexity) of the collective bargaining (negotiations) process. 
Several significant relationships for the third general 
hypothesis were obtained between measures of organization size and 
complexity. The number of members, contracts, and employers (size) 
were positively associated with the number of local unions, 
intermediate bodies, and departments (complexity). Weak to moderate 
relationships existed between organization size and measures of 
occupational and industrial diversity (complexity). Significant 
correlation values also occurred between indicators of size and 
bargaining complexity. 
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BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
Any organization can be conceived as consisting of a set of 
structural components in which growth is accompanied by structural 
changes and influenced by a number of external and internal variables. 
In recent years structural adjustments attracting considerable atten¬ 
tion involve the non-proportional changes of certain organizational 
parts as organizational forms change and become more complex.^ 
Of particular interest has been the "development and expansion 
2 
of a rationally oriented and dependable administrative component." 
Labelling this component the 'apparatus,' Max Weber associated its 
rise with increasing organization size and bureaucratization. He 
considered size as the controlling factor in the development of 
bureaucracy and, concomitant with an increase in organization size, 
3 
a disproportionate increase in administrative staff. 
In this investigation the following question will be analyzed: 
How are the variables of organization size and complexity linked to 
the relative size of the administrative component in a multi-level 
organizational system, national and international labor unions? The 
objectives of the study are: (1) to examine the regional (inter¬ 
mediate) and central headquarters' administrative staffs of unions; 
(2) to identify significant correlates of the relative sizes of these 
administrative components; (3) to investigate the relationship 
between the relative sizes of administrative staffs at the regional 
2 
and central headquarters levels of this multi-level system; (4) to 
develop measures of organization complexity and size; and (5) to 
determine the relationship between these two organization dimensions. 
The Development of Union Bureaucracies 
Historically, union structure and the structure of collective 
bargaining have adapted to changing internal and environmental con¬ 
ditions. Early in the development of unions, AFL unions were 
organized according to skilled worker classifications, local labor 
markets, customized manual technology, small scale production 
facilities, and individual employers.^ As product markets expanded 
and technological advances permitted the development of large scale 
mass production operations, CIO industrial unions were founded in the 
1930's to challenge both large scale industrial management and an 
unyielding craft union structure. These conditions also encouraged 
local unions to confederate into national and international unions. 
Confederated unions tended to develop hierarchically organized struc¬ 
tures which could adequately meet the demands of an increasingly 
complex economic environment and the expanding needs of local 
constituencies. 
In the modern labor movement, administrative centralizing 
tendencies continue for several additional reasons: (1) the rise of 
the corporate conglomerate and the trend toward product diversifica¬ 
tion; (2) the development of coordinated and coalition bargaining; 
(3) shifts in the locus and scope of contract negotiations; (4) the 
3 
quickening pace of union mergers; (5) the increased number, complexity, 
and length of contracts and supplemental agreements; (6) the enormous 
housekeeping tasks associated with maintaining membership rosters, 
filing government reports, and managing multi-million dollar pension 
programs and strike defense funds (7) the increased importance of 
state and national political and legislative activities; and (8) the 
proliferating demands of various federal government agencies. 
In 1929, Berle and Means examined the changes resulting from 
mergers and acquisitions in the managerial and ownership structure of 
American business and industry. They observed that 44 per cent of the 
200 largest nonfinancial corporations and 58 per cent of their assets 
were management controlled.^ Using similar methodology, Larner 
reported that 84.5 per cent of the 200 largest firms and 85 per cent 
of their assets were management controlled in 1962.^ More recently, 
Alexander presented data which substantiated the trend toward concen¬ 
tration and centralization in the American economy. During the 20 
year period from 1948 to 1968, the number of acquisitions increased 
more than ten-fold (223 in 1948 to 2,442 in 1968).^ A major differ- 
o 
ence in the recent merger and acquisition movement from earlier 
movements has been the creation of conglomerates^ rather than 
vertical or horizontal combinations. 
Along with the development of a unified management, a major 
result of the changing character of industrial mergers and acquisi¬ 
tions has been the establishment of a decentralized system of local 
4 
unit collective bargaining. This has provided the multi-company 
conglomerate which bargained on a local basis a strategic advantage 
and has placed the union(s) in a relatively weak position.^ As a 
means of counteracting the conglomerate and limiting fractionalized 
bargaining,^ unions have attempted to extend the bargaining structure 
to a corporate, system, or industry-wide basis through coordinated or 
13 
coalition bargaining. 
Concomitant with the development of coalition and coordinated 
bargaining has been the undermining of local union decision-making^ 
through centralization of collective bargaining negotiations.^ With 
these changes, the bargaining unit or election and representation 
district as established by the National Labor Relations Board declined 
in importance, and the negotiation unit became the key element in the 
structure of collective bargaining.^ Accordingly, the locus of 
decision-making power shifted upward and the scope of the units which 
comprised the bargaining structure expanded. 
As another response to corporate reorganization and the changing 
structure of bargaining, several unions have negotiated merger agree¬ 
ments.^ Thirty-six mergers involving 77 unions have occurred from 
December 1955 (the time of the AFL-CIO merger) to February 1971. 
More than one-third of these mergers have taken place from 1968 to 
18 
1971. 
From reports filed by unions with the Department of Labor, a 
total of 152,831 agreements, exclusive of supplements, welfare and 
5 
19 
pension plans, were in effect in 1970. This was a substantial 
increase over 1960 in which reports yielded a total of 126,000 agree- 
20 
ments. Coupled with this increase has been the expansion of 
contracts from perhaps five to ten pages 20 years ago to a series of 
21 
documents that run to several hundred pages today. Pension plans 
have been a major contributor to the increased complexity and length 
of contracts. From about 15 million workers in 1960, private pension 
plan coverage has grown to about 21 million in 1969. Coverage of 
multi-employer pension plans expanded at an annual rate of 5.7 
per cent, compared to 2.7 per cent for single-employer plans during 
22 
the 1960's. By the end of the decade, nine out of ten workers were 
in plans under which their accrued pension benefits were vested, or 
23 
early retirement was permitted, or both. 
In response to political and legislative developments (domestic 
and world inflation, balance of payments, protective legislation, 
unfair campaign practices, and occupational health and safety) labor 
unions have allocated greater financial and human resources to 
Congressional lobbying, political campaigning, safety engineering, 
and government reporting. Many, if not all, of these allocation 
decisions have been made and carried out by officials attached to 
unions' central headquarters. 
By combining the operation of these forces with the reduction in 
the number of unions and increases in union size, an understanding of 
the tremendous increase in the scale of administrative operations 
within unions can be gained. Standardization of administrative 
6 
activities through written communications and reports has reflected 
the unions' recognition of the need for organizational efficiency.^ 
To meet this need and to increase bargaining power, unions have 
created bureaucratic structures very similar to those of business 
organizations. 
Significance of the Study and Relationship 
to Work of Others 
In the last 25 years many researchers have investigated the 
structure and size of administrative units in a variety of organi¬ 
zations. However, many of these studies have displayed two major 
substantive and methodological shortcomings. First, studies have 
been limited by their adherence to single definitions of the depen¬ 
dent and independent variables. Little effort has been made to 
subdivide the administrative component into different categories of 
employees. Placement of employees in different positions into a 
heterogeneous category has confounded the comparability of research 
findings. To overcome this limitation, four homogeneous administra¬ 
tive classifications will be used in conjunction with a single 
definition of administrative staff. 
Similar conceptual and operational difficulties can be observed 
with regard to the independent variables of size and complexity. For 
example, using the number of administrative departments as a measure 
of complexity has resulted in the investigation of only one complexity 
dimension, structural differentiation. A more sophisticated approach 
7 
will be taken in this study. In addition to several measures of 
structural segmentation, measures of occupational and industrial 
diversity and the structure and complexity of a major union activity 
(collective bargaining) will be used to distinguish organization 
complexity. 
The second principal weakness of previous research has resulted 
from either studying local units of multi-level organizations or local 
units of several different types of organizations. Within a union, 
generally three structural levels can be identified: central head¬ 
quarters, district or regional offices, and local unions. By 
examining only the local administrative component, two major segments 
of the total administrative staff have been excluded. Size and 
structure of the upper two administrative units will be investigated 
in this study. 
Through the above methodological refinements and conceptual 
extensions, the shortcomings of previous research can be partially 
remedied. Accordingly, this research project will be significant for 
the following reasons: (1) the information obtained about union 
structure and administration and the structure and complexity of the 
collective bargaining process; (2) the usefulness of this infor¬ 
mation in understanding and interpreting the nature and dimensions of 
the administrative apparatus; (3) the addition to the empirical 
knowledge of organizations that will enable researchers to become 
further acquainted with this organizational segment; (4) the 
8 
inventory of relevant measures of organization size and complexity 
which will serve as bases for the development of similar measurements 
in the study of other types of organizations; and (5) the development 
of a multi-level analytical framework for the study of organizations. 
Approach of the Study 
To find answers to the major research question and study the 
interrelationships between organizational characteristics, the 
comparative approach to the study of organizations was adopted. This 
research strategy may take the form of a longitudinal analysis of a 
few organizations, or of examining two contrasting organizations, or 
of a cross-sectional investigation of many different organizations 
or a homogeneous category of organizations. In this study, the method 
will be to collect quantitative information on many organizations of 
the same type and apply multivariate analyses to the data. The 
question posed at the beginning of the chapter is how do various 
conditions (size and complexity) influence a certain factor (relative 
administrative size). This question may be answered using multiple 
regression and correlation. The relationships of several independent 
variables to one dependent variable can be determined with these 
techniques. 
9 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL CONTEXT, MAJOR PROPOSITIONS, AND 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE SIZE 
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPONENT 
Much research has been done attempting to identify various 
organization dimensions that may affect the relative size of the 
administrative component. Studies have varied according to the num¬ 
ber and types of organizations investigated, the number and measure¬ 
ment of independent variables analyzed, and the methodologies 
employed. However, most of these studies have stemmed from Max 
Weber’s theory of bureaucracy. 
This chapter will briefly present Weber's theory and develop 
four propositions incorporating organization size and complexity as 
major determinants of relative administrative size. Following each 
proposition, appropriate empirical evidence will be discussed and 
table summaries provided to facilitate comparison of research results. 
In addition to organization size and complexity, three other 
independent variables (age of the organization, managerial succession, 
and the separation of ownership and management) have been identified 
as affecting the relative size of the administrative component. A 
summary of the research concerning these factors will be made at 
the end of the chapter. 
13 
Weber's Theory of Bureaucracy 
The formal structure of almost all modern administrative 
organizations can be conceptualized as a bureaucracy. According to 
Max Weber, the main characteristics of a bureaucratic structure are 
the following: 
(1) There is the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional 
areas, which are generally ordered by rules, that is, by 
laws or administrative regulations. 
(2) The principle of office hierarchy and of levels of graded 
authority mean a firmly ordered system of super- and 
subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower 
offices by the higher ones. 
(3) The management of the modern office is based on written 
documents ('the files'). 
(4) Office management, at least all specialized office manage¬ 
ment, usually presupposes thorough and expert training. 
(5) When the office is fully developed, official activity 
demands the full working capacity of the official, irrespec¬ 
tive of the fact that his obligatory time in the bureau may 
be firmly delimited. 
(6) The management of the office follows general rules, which 
are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which 
can be learned.1 
He believed that an organization designed from these principles 
would display maximum rational decision-making and administrative 
efficiency. Bureaucracy resulted in optimum efficiency because it 
attracted highly qualified people who become experts at selecting and 
applying correct decision rules, because disciplined performance 
governed by abstract rules and coordinated by the hierarchy of 
authority fostered a continuous pursuit of organizational objectives. 
14 
and because the employment and reward systems encouraged employees 
o 
to develop career orientations. 
Bureaucracy, Product of Increasing Size 
Of the several conditions identified by Max Weber as 
3 
contributing to the development of bureaucracy, he considered 
organization size as the controlling factor. In discussing legal 
authority with employment of a bureaucratic administrative staff, 
Weber mentioned, "the same phenomena (bureaucratic characteristics) 
are found in the large-scale capitalistic enterprise; and the larger 
it is, the greater their role."^ He further emphasized the impor¬ 
tance of large size by stating that "only by reversion in every 
field--political, religious, economic, etc.--to small-scale organi¬ 
zation would it be possible to any considerable extent to escape its 
(bureaucracy’s) influence.When examining German political parties 
(before World War I), Michels supported Weber by observing that: 
. . . the modern party endeavors to give to its own organization 
the widest possible base, and to attach to itself in financial 
bonds the largest possible number of individuals. Thus arises 
the need for a strong bureaucracy, and these tendencies are 
reinforced by the increase in the tasks imposed by modern 
organization.^ 
While Weber suggested many advantages of a large administrative 
staff, others have pointed out the dysfunctional consequences of 
large size and the development of bureaucracy. According to Barnard, 
one important result of the inherent difficulty of securing an 
adequate compensation system and scheme of incentives was: 
15 
. . . the innate propensity of all organizations to expand. The 
overreaching which arises from this cause is the source of 
destruction of organizations otherwise successful, since growth 
often so upsets the economy of incentives, through its reactions 
upon the effectiveness and efficiency of organization.^ 
In a discussion of the impact of organization structure on 
employee morale, Worthy commented that one of the most serious lia¬ 
bilities of over-specialization and extensive division of labor was 
the "fact that they so greatly expand the size of the administrative 
g 
unit." Caplow has pointed out that: 
. . . large groups apparently devote a larger proportion of their 
resources to their own operation than do small groups. It would 
appear that small groups require proportionately less self¬ 
maintenance. There is an almost universal belief that the admin¬ 
istrative and overhead components of any organization increase 
out of proportion to increases in its size.” 
In a similar vein, characterizing administrative personnel as 
parasitic in nature, Parkinson contended that: 
. . . the number of the officials and the quantity of the work 
are not related to each other at all. The rise in the total of 
those employed is governed by Parkinson's 'Law' and would be much 
the same whether the volume of the work were to increase, diminish 
or even disappear.-*-® 
Referring to the biological aspects of organizations, Haire 
suggested that as "physical objects get bigger but retain the same 
proportions, they get weaker, and a larger and larger proportion must 
go toward supporting their own mass.''^ From this observation, he 
formulated the 'square-cube law' which advanced "that mass grows by 
12 
a cube function while surface grows by a square." Haire used the 
law to develop a growth relationship between external employees 
(square of the outside) and internal employees (cube of the inside). 
16 
From the above discussion, the first proposition may be stated 
as follows: 
Proposition One 
The relative size of the administrative component increases at 
an increasing rate as the size of the organization increases. 
Empirical Evidence--Organization Size 
Studies investigating the above proposition have followed two 
general research strategies: longitudinal analysis or cross-sectional 
analysis. Research findings indicated, contrary to Weber, Parkinson 
and others, that increases in organization size did not necessarily 
produce a disproportionate increase in the relative number of 
administrative personnel. 
Longitudinal Studies 
Melman examined the magnitude of administrative overhead in 
relation to size variables, corporate organization, multi-plant firms, 
age of firm, concentration, profitability, pricing practices, selling 
effort, employment of technicians, and product type. Finding that 
differences in the magnitude of administrative overhead at one time 
and over a period of time appeared to be independent of all variables 
tested (except size), he inferred that size, regardless of the cri¬ 
terion used as a measure of size (average number of wage-earners per 
establishment, average value added per establishment, physical output 
of the industry, and number of wage-earners in the industry), was a 
differentiating factor in administrative overhead. Decreasing 
17 
administrative ratios were associated with increasing size. Bendix 
made a similar observation in a study of German industrial firms. 
His data showed the proportion of administrative personnel declined 
somewhat with increasing firm size. However, administrative ratios 
taken from three time periods (1907, 1925, and 1933) tended to 
increase regardless of the size category.^ 
Three other studies analyzed the ratio of staff to total 
employment for each year during the growth of a limited number of 
firms. In the first, Haire noticed that after an initial period of 
growth (six to ten years), the growth of line and staff employment in 
four firms progressed at quite similar rates. Early, the staff grew 
geometrically as the line grew linearly, but this relation tapered 
off to parallel growth, stabilizing at about 25 per cent of total 
employment in two firms and at about 50 per cent in the other two.^ 
Following Haire's design, Draper and Strother observed the same growth 
pattern of line and staff in an educational institution. After an 
initial period of disproportionate staff growth, both segments 
expanded in a parallel fashion."^ in the third study, Filley computed 
the growth of staff in five firms. Contrary to the previous two 
studies, the data displayed mixed rather than similar patterns of 
staff growth. From this evidence, he concluded that staff growth 
was not solely a function of total employment.^ 
Two recent analyses of Canadian and U.S. school systems yielded 
findings somewhat consistent with those above. Using multiple 
18 
measures of relative administrative size, Holdaway and Blowers 
constructed individual growth curves for the period 1964-65 through 
1968-69 for 41 school systems in western Canada. The changes in 
administrative ratios exhibited by these graphs showed no consistent 
tendency to rise or fall over the five-year period. In contrast to 
this finding, they presented cross-sectional data of the same school 
systems which revealed that smaller administrative ratios tended to 
1 8 
be associated with larger system size. Hendershot and James 
examined the effects of organization growth and size on the ratio of 
supervisors to teachers in 299 American districts. The supervisory 
ratios were calculated for two school years, 1949-50 and 1955-56. 
For both points in time, the correlation between district size 
(measured by the number of students) and the supervisory ratio was 
19 
-.13, "indicating a stable negative relationship." 
In all seven of the above studies, organization size and 
relative administrative size were either inversely related or not 
related at all over a period of time (see Table 2-1 for comparative 
summary). However, one other study contradicted these findings. In 
a study of ten voluntary associations, Tsouderos found membership 
growth was directly related to the number of administrative office 




Baker and Davis analyzed data from 211 manufacturing companies 
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in a firm increased arithmetically, the total number of indirect 
workers tended to increase geometrically. Results showed each group 
tended to increase in an arithmetic progression. In a study of 
California school districts, Terrien and Mills presented data which 
confirmed Weber's proposition that size was the controlling factor 
in the development of bureaucracy and that an increase in organiza¬ 
tion size was accompanied by an increasing proportion of administra¬ 
tive personnel. In three types of school systems, they reported the 
size of the administrative component increased at a greater rate 
than the total size of the containing organization. For Terrien and 
Mills these findings indicated the "school administrator may expect 
that the percentage of his organization devoted to administrative 
22 
tasks may rise as his organization expands." 
Contrary to the findings above, the remaining investigations 
showed either a decrease in the relative number of administrative 
personnel as organization size increased or no relationship between 
the two variables. Defining the supportive (administrative) component 
as those persons engaged in activities which contributed indirectly 
to the attainment of organization goals, Haas, Hall, and Johnson 
analyzed data solicited from executives of 30 organizations. They 
observed that the percentage of personnel engaged in supportive 
activities actually declined as organization size increased. Although 
they suggested that the relationship may be curvilinear, it was main- 
tained across different types of organizations. Taking a slightly 
different approach, Indik examined the relationship between 
22 
organization unit size and supervision ratios in five sets of 
organizations (116 organizations in all). In each organization set 
there was a significant negative slope to the plotted curves: as 
size of the unit decreased, the supervision ratio decreased. 
Although the analysis utilized static measures, he suggested that 
if a dynamic view were taken, the structure of the unit was probably 
set early, and additions to the supervisory staff came as size 
increased but not at a sufficient rate to maintain the earlier level 
ry / 
of the supervision ratio. 
Hawley, Boland, and Boland reported similar evidence in a study 
of 97 institutions of higher education. Expecting size of the admin¬ 
istrative staff to vary directly with population size (number of 
part-time and full-time faculty), they found the ratio of administra- 
25 tion to faculty declined as size of faculty increased. Lindenfeld 
arrived at the same conclusion in an analysis of personnel data of 
323 secondary school systems. His results suggested the larger the 
size of the school district, as measured by total administrative and 
instructional staff, the smaller the proportion assigned to high 
level administrative work. With increasing size the relative size 
of the administrative component declined regularly from 3.1 per cent 
of the whole in the smallest districts to 0.7 per cent in the 
largest.^ 
In two recent analyses, Rushing studied the effects of industry 
size (number of production personnel) on relative administrative 
size. He used five administrative categories (managers, clerical. 
23 
professional, sales, and service) and the mean number of production 
personnel per firm (calculated by dividing the total number of pro¬ 
duction employees by the total number of firms per industry) to test 
proposition one. Overall, industry size and relative administrative 
size were inversely related, but the different administrative compo¬ 
nents were linked to organization size in quite different ways. 
Firm size had negative effects "on managerial and sales personnel, 
positive effects on professional and clerical employees, and a weak 
27 
and inconsistent effect on service personnel." 
Examining administrative ratios in 36 U.S. Army Hospitals, 
Tosi and Patt found the ratio of administrative personnel to total 
personnel decreased as size of the containing organization 
increased.Lending support to this finding, Pondy found admini¬ 
strative intensity to decrease with organization size. Administra¬ 
tive intensity was defined as the number of managers, professionals, 
and clerical employees divided by the number of craftsmen, operatives, 
29 
and laborers employed by the organization. 
In two other studies, administrative ratios displayed 
disproportionate reductions with increasing organization size. 
Using a logarithmic model, Klatzky showed that size decreased the 
staff component at a decreasing rate, the slope of the relationship 
30 
became flatter and flatter. A similar convex curve illustrating 
this relationship was reported by Blau and Schoenherr in a study of 
employment security offices. This finding led them to suggest that 
24 
administrative costs exhibit an economy of scale which may diminish 
31 
with increasing size. 
During the 1950's a series of yearly surveys was conducted by 
Nelson, England and Yoder to determine variances in personnel ratios 
(the number of persons assigned to a personnel department relative to 
total employment) across different business and industrial firms. 
From their analysis they concluded that size was not generally related 
32 
to the personnel ratio. Further, the long-term study showed that 
the type of industry and complexity of organization structure were 
more relevant in assessing the role and scope of the personnel func- 
33 tion in business organizations. Hall also found that organization 
34 
size was not the critical determinant of overall bureaucratization. 
In two of the previously discussed studies (Indik and Haas, 
et al.) labor union locals were included in the organizations sampled. 
Both studies reported an inverse relationship between organization 
size and relative size of the administrative component. Due to the 
small number of union locals included in the two samples, it cannot 
be determined whether this relationship would be maintained in a 
larger, more representative sample of unions. However, one study 
dealt with relative administrative size in British unions. Clegg, 
Killick and Adams computed several administrative-member ratios for 
15 national unions. No statistical analyses were performed on the 
data, but the raw data tables showed no consistent pattern between 
the ratios and size. Both large and small unions displayed high and 
35 
low administrative ratios. 
25 
The last illustration to be cited is research on 49 Veterans 
Administration Hospitals by Anderson and Warkov. They found an 
inverse relationship between hospital size (measured by the annual 
average daily patient load) and percentage of personnel in admini¬ 
stration. While acknowledging that size was a powerful explanatory 
variable, they suggested that organization complexity apart from size 
might be directly associated with the proportion of administrative 
personnel. They set forth three hypotheses for future testing: 
(1) The relative size of the administrative component decreases 
as the number of persons performing identical tasks in the 
same place increases. 
(2) The relative size of the administrative component increases 
as the number of places at which work is performed increases. 
(3) The relative size of the administrative component increases 
as the number of tasks performed at the same place increases 
(or roles become increasingly specialized and differen¬ 
tiated).^ 
The next section will focus on the nature of complexity and the 
studies which have tested these and other administrative size- 
complexity hypotheses. 
After a review of numerous quantitative studies of administra¬ 
tive structure and growth in 1965, Starbuck concluded that the 
administrative ratio for "organizations with more than 100 employees 
37 
. ... is essentially independent of organization size." From 
this review (see Table 2-2 for a comparative summary), the conclusion 
can be drawn that organization size and relative administrative size 
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with this conclusion are Baker and Davis, Tsouderos, and Terrien and 
Mills. 
Bureaucracy, Product of Increasing Complexity 
Another important organization dimension closely related to 
size is complexity. Zelditch and Hopkins stressed, "large size is 
not in itself a critical characteristic of organizations. Rather, 
what appears to be important is complexity, which is often indicated 
by size but is quite distinct from it."^ Similarly, Kahn, Wolfe, 
et al. commented that: 
. . . with increased size the structure of the organization 
becomes much more complex. The division of labor becomes more 
differentiated and specialized; more levels of supervision are 
introduced to maintain coordination and control; and more people 
become involved in organizational planning.39 
In a discussion of functional complexity in a growing organi¬ 
zation, Davis expressed the law of functional growth: 
The various functions of an organization increase in scope and 
complexity, as well as the amount of work and the technical 
requirements for their proper performance, as the volume of 
business grows. The complexity of functional relationships 
tends to increase in geometric progression as the volume of 
work that the organization must handle increases in arithmetic 
40 progression. u 
According to this view, if functional complexity increases and staff 
units assist the line in planning and controlling activities, then 
staff units may expand faster than the line organizations they aid. 
The Nature of Complexity 
Complexity generally refers to the degree of internal differ 
entiation of an organization, but it may also pertain to the 
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variability and heterogeneity of an organization's task and economic 
environment. Internal differentiation can be analyzed by looking at 
the division of labor, structural segmentation, functional speciali¬ 
zation, role structure, or interpersonal relationships. The extent 
to which work is divided can be determined by either counting the 
number of distinguishable tasks^ or by taking into account the dis¬ 
tribution of individuals among tasks or throughout the structural 
/ o 
parts of an organization. Structural segmentation means the number 
/ Q 
of organizational parts, such as, levels in the hierarchy, depart- 
/t /| /i ^ 
ment, and branches or subunits in dispersed locations. The 
number of different occupations^ and the number of staff positions 
/ *7 
(professional experts; denote functional specialization. Role 
structure is the prescribed configuration of roles in a social 
A Q 
structure. It can be inspected by examining a comprehensive and 
detailed organization chart or by determining the presence or absence 
AO 
of written job descriptions. To determine the interconnectedness 
of individuals in an organization, span of control can be investi¬ 
gated. Graicunas argued and demonstrated mathematically that arith¬ 
metical increases in the number of subordinates reporting directly to 
a manager were accompanied by potentially geometric increases in the 
I 
number of personal relationships within the work unit of the manager.' 
Accordingly, interpersonal relationships become exceedingly complex. 
Several recent analyses suggested that complex organizations 
develop to cope and interact with rich and constantly changing 
31 
environments. Utilizing case histories and a comparative approach, 
Chandler explained that structural design of an organization was 
determined and guided by strategic decision-making. Shifts in strat¬ 
egy were responses (re-allocation of existing resources and develop¬ 
ment of new ones) to changes in market demands.^ Burns and Stalker 
focused on the adjustments in management practices in 20 industrial 
52 
firms which stemmed from changes in technologies as well as markets. 
r O r / 
Lending support to these positions. Woodward3 and Harvey3^ presented 
data which showed differences in organization technology to be 
differentially related to certain structural variables (levels of 
authority, spans of control, and ratios of managers and supervisors 
to total personnel). As a means of adjusting to changing technolog¬ 
ical and market environments, Thompson posited that organizations 
should construct units to filter, stabilize, and regulate input and 
output transactions to allow the core technology of the organization 
the opportunity to operate in an environment of technical rational¬ 
ity.^^ In a study by Lawrence and Lorsch, these units functioned as 
c £ 
integrating devices to link basic departments and resolve conflicts. 
All of the above definitions and propositions concerning 
organization complexity rest on one basic underlying assumption: 
that the coordination of organization activities becomes increasingly 
more difficult with greater numbers of individuals, tasks, roles, 
structural parts, and environmental disturbances. Differentiation 
makes an organization more complex. Complexity creates problems of 
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coordination. These problems demand the attention of line supervisors 
and staff experts. Consequently, more administrative personnel are 
needed in more highly differentiated structures and organizational 
environments. With this understanding, the second proposition may be 
stated as follows: 
Proposition Two 
The relative size of the administrative component increases as 
organization complexity increases. 
Empirical Evidence--Organization Complexity 
Various operational definitions of complexity have been utilized 
in 13 studies which focused on this proposition. Some of the 
researchers looked at the division of labor and structural differen¬ 
tiation, others classified different technologies according to their 
degree of complexity, and a few referred to the spatial dispersion of 
members and organization subunits. 
Melman suggested that large administrative outlays would be 
associated with intensity of mechanization and that multi-plant firms 
would require relatively greater administrative staffs than single¬ 
plant companies. The magnitude of administrative overhead did not 
appear to be related to the number of plants within a firm, but the 
ratio of administrative to production personnel did vary with degree 
of mechanization (measured by average horsepower per wage-earner). 
This finding led Melman to infer that enlargement of the administra¬ 
tive component may be connected with the addition of new administra¬ 
tive functions stemming from increased mechanization."^ 
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Anderson and Warkov postulated that task differentiation and 
spatial dispersion may contribute to the addition of administrative 
personnel. In testing for a relationship between number of operating 
sites and size of the supportive staff, Haas, et a1. did not find a 
significant association. In fact, the result was in the opposite 
direction. Similarly, they did not find a significant difference 
between the relative size of the supportive component and number of 
58 
organization activities (task differentiation). 
Edna Raphael provided partial support for the Anderson and 
Warkov hypotheses with a study of 65 union locals. Her data indi¬ 
cated that relative administrative size decreased as the spatial 
dispersion of members increased. Local unions in which members were 
employed at several spatially separated work places had a smaller 
administrative staff than those unions in which members were employed 
at one or a few locations. The analysis also disclosed that size of 
the administrative component increased with diversity of members' 
occupations; industrial unions had a larger administrative apparatus 
than craft unions.^ A related finding has been reported by 
Stinchcombc in a comparative study of bureaucratic and craft admini¬ 
stration. Using the employment of clerks as an index of bureaucrat¬ 
ization, he observed that the proportion of all administrative 
personnel who were clerks was consIderably greater in mass production 
industries than it was in construction.^ 
Several studies have examined the effects of structural 
differentiation on relative administrative size. Designating the 
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number of departments and non-departmentalized schools as an index of 
complexity, Hawley, et al. found the ratio of full-time administra- 
tors per 100 faculty declined as complexity increased. In an 
attempt to isolate mutually independent dimensions of organization 
structure, Pugh, et al. reported that relative size of the supportive 
component (encompassing percentage of clerks and non-workflow per¬ 
sonnel) was independent of a factor (structuring of activities) which 
contained specialization (division of labor) and vertical span of 
control (levels in the hierarchy). Klatzky's data showed a negative 
regression coefficient between number of divisions and size of the 
staff component, indicating that functional differentiation reduced 
the staff percentage. 
Evidence contradictory to that above has been presented by a 
A/ 4 c 
number of investigators. Rushing 4 and Pondy reported that relative 
size of administration was directly associated with functional 
complexity (division of labor). Both men used the same measure of 
division of labor which was given by 
D = 1 
(EX)2 
where D was the division of labor and X the number of persons in an 
occupational grouping. The Blau and Schoenherr analysis revealed 
that three aspects of structural complexity (multiple levels, many 
divisions, and many sections per division) increased the managerial 
ratio at employment security headquarters, whereas only multiple 
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levels significantly increased the administrative staff ratio. 
Data generated by Blau, et al. from a study of 156 public personnel 
agencies displayed direct connections between measures of differen¬ 
tiation (professionalization and division of labor) and size of the 
administrative component.^ 
The remaining aspect of organization complexity concerns the 
mechanisms or processes by which an organization turns out its product 
or service. Woodward, Harvey, and Hickson, et al. in related studies 
have systematically explored the relationships between organization 
technology and selected properties of organization structure. In a 
study of 100 manufacturing firms in the South East Essex area of 
England, Woodward placed three groupings of firms along a scale of 
technical complexity, determined by the extent to which the production 
process was controllable and its results predictable. In ascending 
order of complexity and in order of chronological development, these 
groupings were: (1) unit and small batch, (2) large batch and mass, 
and (3) process or continuous flow. The analysis revealed direct 
relationships between increasing technological complexity and ratios 
of managers to total personnel, clerical and administrative staff to 
68 
manual workers, and direct to indirect labor. 
With a slight modification of Woodward's production continuity 
scale, Hickson, et al. tested for correlates of technical complexity 
in 31 manufacturing organizations. Unlike Woodward, none of the 
linear relations between variables of structural configuration and 
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technology were repeated in this sample. However, from a new 
formulation of operations technology (workflow integration), the 
percentage of non-workflow employees was found to be significantly 
related to the degree of technical complexity. Workflow integration 
referred to the degree of automated, continuous, fixed-sequence 
operations in the technology. All employees with no direct or super¬ 
visory responsibility for work on throughputs were labeled as 
69 
non-workflow personnel. 
Harvey categorized 43 industrial organizations along a continuum 
from technical diffuseness to technical specificity. Technical 
diffuseness referred to a firm in which a number of processes yielded 
a wide range of products. It was measured by the number of product 
changes and corresponded to Woodward's distinction of unit production. 
From the analysis, the ratio of managers and supervisors to total 
personnel increased with technical specificity (process production on 
Woodward's scale).^ 
Because of the numerous measures of complexity and generally 
inconsistent findings (see Table 2-3 for a comparative summary) 
regarding the connection between this variable and relative size of 
the administrative apparatus, it would be presumptuous to make any 
conclusive statements about proposition two. To characterize an 
organization as complex when it has two plants instead of one is an 
oversimplification. Given these reservations, however, it would 
appear the relative size of the administrative component may be 
affected more by increased complexity than increased size. 
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Relationship of Organization Size and Complexity 
When evaluating the two previously stated propositions, two 
questions should be investigated: (1) What is the relationship 
between organization size and complexity? and (2) What effect does 
this relationship have on the relative size of the administrative 
component? The first question refers to the connection between the 
independent variables, while the second refers to the interaction 
effect of complexity with size on the dependent variable. 
In a study of small bureaucracies, Blau, et al. suggested that 
structural differentiation was typically a consequence of expanding 
size. According to this view, size and complexity may be directly 
related (large organizations being complex and small organizations 
relatively simple) or similarly related to other organization dimen¬ 
sions. In a later formulation, Blau proposed that "increasing size 
generates structural differentiation in organizations along various 
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dimensions at decelerating rates." The differentiation promoted by 
large size may have a tendency to decline beyond a certain point. 
Carrying the relationship further, Klatzky postulated that the rate 
of differentiation may decline absolutely as well as relatively as an 
organization increases in size. This relationship would approximate 
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an inverted U-shaped curve. In either case, the nature of the 
relationship will depend upon the measure(s) of differentiation. 
Accordingly, the third proposition may be expressed as follows: 
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Proposition Three 
Organization complexity increases as the size of the 
organization increases and tends toward a convex curvilinear relation¬ 
ship . 
Empirical Evidence--Size and Complexity 
From the factual information concerning propositions one and 
two, it appeared that organization size and complexity were inversely 
related. In all but three studies, size was either inversely related 
or not connected to relative administrative size. Complexity was 
found to be directly linked to relative size of the administrative 
appartus in nine of thirteen investigations. Surprisingly, ten of 
twelve studies showed a positive association between size and complex¬ 
ity. The two which did not report a relationship were concerned with 
the degree of technical complexity. For Woodward "there appeared to 
be no significant relations"7^ between structure and size. Similarly, 
technology and size appeared to be unrelated in the South East Essex 
organizations. This finding was also arrived at by Harvey.7^ 
Increased size was related to increased task specialization in 
three of the sets of organizations studied by Indik. Blau, et al. 
noted that size exerted a strong influence on the division of labor 
and mild influences on the degree of centralization and professional¬ 
ization.77 Rushing reported a weak relationship between size and 
78 
complexity, the Spearman rank correlation yielded a value of .24. 
Size and spatial dispersion of local union membership were associated 
42 
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in S&phsel1 s study. Using data from 75 diverse organizations, 
Hall. et al» found three sets of complexity indicators (spatial dis¬ 
persion. division of labor, and hierarchical differentiation) related 
SO 
to sire.'"' both functional and hierarchical differentiation were 
correlated positively with sire in a study of 254 city, county, and 
state departments of finance by Meyer. Ihe simple correlation between 
sire (number of employees and number of divisions was .43 and size 
and number of levels was .51. The positive correlation (.48) 
between sire and division of labor in Por.dy's study was also rela- 
tively high. ~ A lover, but significant, positive relationship (.38) 
between functional differentiation and sire was calculated by 
83 
Klatnky. In the manufacturing sample of Hickson, et al., size 
'correlated with the technology measure (production continuity), 
.”5 with structuring activities, and .77 with vertical span."'"- 
Although some of the size-complexity associations were 
relatively weak in the nine studies mentioned above (see Table 2-4 
fcr a commararive summary , the evidence does support the first part 
of rrcrositicn three. The remaining illustration provided partial 
support for the rest of the proposition. Wien comparing total state 
r remcies. 5lau and Schcemerr observed that increases in size ve-e. 
. . . accompanied by initially rapid and subsequently more 
tradual increases in the number or local branches inuo which 
the agency is spatially differentiated; the number of official 
occuzaticral positions expressing the division of labor; the 
number of levels in the hierarchy; the number of functional 
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Within agency subunits internal differentiation also occurred at 
86 declining rates with increasing size. 
Interaction Effect of Organization Size and Complexity 
On Relative Administrative Size 
The interaction effect of complexity with size on the relative 
size of the administrative component may hinge on the extent to which 
increases in size foster greater differentiation,, If increases in 
organization size generate additional problems of coordination, new 
integrative units may be created to cope with these developments. 
With this greater differentiation, the proportion of administrative 
personnel may rise. In this case, the indirect effect of size would 
be to enlarge the administrative component. On the other hand, if the 
increase in the administrative ratio resulting from greater differen¬ 
tiation is less than the reduction of this ratio by large size, then 
the overall effect of increasing size must outweigh its indirect 
effect. The assumption underlying the interaction effect arises 
from the idea that different coordination problems may require differ¬ 
ent organization responses. With this in mind, the fourth proposition 
may be formulated as follows: 
Proposition Four 
The interaction effect of complexity with size directly affects 
the relative size of the administrative component when the effects of 
size are controlled. 
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Empirical Evidence--Interaction Effect 
of Organization Size and Complexity 
The earliest study to test the above proposition reported 
results in the opposite direction from that proposed. When eliminat¬ 
ing the effect of size on the complexity-staff relationship, Hawley, 
et al. reduced the partial correlation coefficient from .680 to .372. 
Organization size appeared to be the dominant influence in determining 
88 
the size of the administrative component. In Raphael's study, the 
direct effect of larger membership size on relative administrative 
size tended to be dampened by the association between size and spatial 
dispersion. A positive correlation between size and relative size of 
the administrative component appeared only when spatial dispersion 
89 
was held constant. 
The interaction between size and complexity tended to accentuate 
the direct effect of size on the administrative component in Rushing's 
industry study. Size decreased the positive effect of complexity, 
and the negative effect of size increased when the division of labor 
increased. The interactive effect held for managers and clerical 
employees but not for professional personnel.^ Hickson, et al. also 
found that the effect of size overshadowed the influence of production 
continuity on the proportion of non-workflow employees. When holding 
size constant, the correlation between non-workflow percentage and 
production continuity dropped from .22 to -.04.^ Klatzky's inter¬ 
action model showed that as the number of divisions increased, the 
effect of size on the staff component was reduced, but beyond a 
47 
certain point on the scale of differentiation, the effect of 
differentiation disappeared and the slope of the size-staff relation- 
go 
ship became negative again. 
The pervasive effects of size were also evident in the analysis 
of Blau and Schoenherr. For both the staff and managerial ratios, 
the direct effect of size exceeded its overall effect. Size tended 
to depress administrative ratios even though the differentiation it 
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fostered enlarged the relative size of the administrative component. 
Other than the finding of Raphael, the interaction between size and 
complexity operated to reduce the association between complexity and 
relative administrative size. 
Effects of Other Variables on Relative 
Administrative Size 
Another independent variable associated with expansion of 
administrative staff can be traced to Gouldner's research on the 
growth of bureaucracy as a consequence of managerial succession in a 
gypsum plant. To bridge a communication gap between himself and the 
rest of the plant, the new plant manager opened up new supervisory 
positions. This rapid change in supervisory personnel was felt by 
Gouldner to be so common that he gave it a distinctive label, strate¬ 
gic replacement.^ Carlson recorded a similar observation in an 
investigation of executive succession in California public school 
systems. Taking the size of the central office administrative staff 
as an index of relative administrative size, he found that 26 of 36 
48 
new superintendents increased the central office staff during their 
first two years in office. From the proposition advanced by Whisler 
that a greater percentage of corporate presidents brought in from the 
9 5 
outside will use an assistant than presidents promoted from within, 
he noted that the number and proportion of outside successors who 
added to the central staff was greater than the number and proportion 
of inside successors who did so. Selecting the 26 largest and 27 
smallest firms from Fortune magazine's 500, Grusky hypothesized that 
strategic replacements at the top should be less likely to occur 
following succession in large, bureaucratized firms and more likely to 
occur after succession in small ones. His data showed a positive 
relationship between frequency of succession and strategic replace¬ 
ments in the small firms. No relationship was found in the large 
firms. ^ 
Five studies have tested for a relationship between organization 
age and relative administrative size. Haire found that staff as a 
per cent of total employment showed a steep increase during the first 
six to ten years in each of four firms. Beyond the ten years, the 
staff and total number of employees tended to grow at similar rates, 
but as a company aged, the tendency to acquire a larger percentage of 
clerks appeared.^ Draper and Strother also observed this trend in 
both staff and total growth, but the proportions did not become 
99 
relatively stable until after twenty years. y 
Haas, etal. suggested that as age of the organization increased, 
the percentage of persons engaged in supportive activities would 
49 
increase at a disproportionate rate. Rank order correlation 
coefficients were computed using two supportive component categories 
and in both cases the results were not significant. An analysis of 
Wilensky's data on labor union staff experts^^ by Haas, etal. 
disclosed no significant relation between age of a union and per¬ 
centage of staff experts. 
101 
This was consistent with Melman's find¬ 
ing of no clear relationship between administrative overhead and firm 
102 
age. 
The last independent variable linked to the administrative 
component was a measure of the separation of ownership and management 
(percentage of owner-managers for an industry). In Pondy's analysis, 
administrative intensity was found to increase with the separation of 
ownership and management. 
Summary and Conclusions 
From the studies of the determinants of relative administrative 
size, the following tentative conclusions can be drawn: 
(1) The relative size of the administrative component probably 
decreases with increases in organization size. Of the 24 studies 
testing for a relationship between size and relative administrative 
size, 15 of them are consistent with this conclusion. 
(2) The relative size of the administrative component may 
increase with increasing organization complexity. Evidence supporting 
this conclusion can be found in 9 of 13 investigations. Only two 
studies reported an inverse relationship between the two variables. 
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(3) Organization size and complexity apparently are not 
independent variables. Out of 12 studies, 10 showed a positive 
association between size and complexity. 
(4) The interaction between size and complexity tends to 
suppress the relationship between complexity and relative administra¬ 
tive size. Only one of six studies did not support this conclusion. 
(5) Of the remaining three independent variables, managerial 
succession and separation of ownership and management had direct 
influences on the relative size of the administrative apparatus. 
Administrative ratios probably do not increase over time. Three of 
five studies testing for a relationship between age of the organi¬ 
zation and relative administrative size did not find a significant 
relation. 
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DEFINITIONS, HYPOTHESES, AND RESEARCH METHODS 
Individuals interested in organization structure and design 
have undoubtedly encountered difficulties in interpreting and using 
much of the available information about these aspects of large-scale 
organizations. To partially overcome these problems. Price has 
suggested that inventories^ of organization measurements should be 
2 
compiled. Such inventories would enhance the comparability of 
research results and encourage the development of a common set of 
organization terms and concepts. 
In the first section of this chapter, the unit of study 
(dependent variable) will be defined and several measures of organi¬ 
zation size and complexity (independent variables) will be inventoried. 
Following the explanation of terms and concepts, four general hypoth¬ 
eses and several working hypotheses will be formulated. Statistical 
methods and data collection procedures will be discussed in the final 
section. 
Explanation of Terms and Concepts 
The Administrative Component 
Employees in large-scale organizations may be differentiated 
according to the nature of their task or the functional character of 
their occupation: administrative-production, indirect-direct, staff 
line, or buffer-core. Bendix and Granick identified administrative 
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staff as salaried employees and white-collar servicing personnel, 
respectively. Using similar definitions, Stinchcombe,^ Pondy,^ and 
Q 
Rushing referred to administrative personnel as all those in the 
standard occupational census categories of ’managerial,' 'profes¬ 
sional,' and 'clerical' personnel. Following a residual classifica¬ 
tion procedure, Melman lumped all employees not directly involved in 
production activities (wage earners) into the administrative component 
(salaried employees). In an attempt to broaden these definitions, 
Haas, Hall and Johnson included not only administrative personnel in 
the administrative unit but also non-administrative employees who were 
engaged in supportive or indirect organizational activities. Suppor¬ 
tive activities comprised such tasks as bookkeeping, personnel 
administration, custodial work, and maintenance services.^ 
From these definitions, administrative staff can be considered 
a multi-dimensional term. A useful definition would seem to be one 
which is applicable to many situations and types of organizations. 
Accordingly, administrative staff is defined as the personnel of an 
organizational system who are primarily oriented to and perform 
decision-making, control, and service activities. Administrators 
manage an organization's internal affairs, represent the organization 
in its external environmental relations, and render services to 
subunit organizations.^ 
Within an international union, generally three structural levels 
can be distinguished: central headquarters, district or regional 
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offices, and local unions. Attached to each level is an administra¬ 
tive staff. At union headquarters, executive officers (president and 
secretary-treasurer) are assisted by staff experts (lawyers, statis¬ 
ticians, economists, etc.) in conducting the union's affairs. The 
staff experts (professionals) are 'men of knowledge' in the sense 
that they bring to the problem at hand a body of specialized informa- 
12 
tion and skill. Organizers and representatives occupy important 
staff roles at the regional or intermediate level. In addition to 
soliciting new members, forming new locals, and negotiating labor 
contracts, the continuing function of a representative (or organizer) 
is to act as advisor to all locals within his region with regard to 
employer relations and internal union affairs. At the local union 
level, the business agent coordinates the activities of the local, 
maintains its office and files, sometimes collects dues, and may even 
operate the union's hiring hall. At all three levels, clerks and 
secretaries aid administrative officials in their tasks when admini¬ 
strative activities become standardized through formal written 
communications and reports. 
Measurement of Administrative Size 
In this study, only the central and regional administrative 
components will be studied. Accordingly, four administrative groups 
will be considered: managers and administrators, organizers and 
representatives, professional staff employees, and clerks and 
secretaries. 
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Size of the administrative component can be measured in several 
ways: number of administrators, number of administrative activities, 
number of problems solved and decisions made, dollar payments to 
administrators, or the total amount of administrative overhead. 
Number of administrative employees will serve as the measure of 
administrative size. With multiple administrative categories, five 
measures of the administrative component are necessary, four rela¬ 
tively homogeneous measures corresponding to the four groups 
specified above and one heterogeneous measure for the administrative 
component as a whole. 
Organization Size and its Measurement 
Size is an important but ambiguous characteristic of the social 
structure of organizations.^ It generally refers to quantity, scope, 
or depth. Measures of organization size should correspond to these 
dimensions or incorporate as many of them as possible. In this study, 
union size will be specified as follows: (1) number of members, 
(2) average local union size (average membership), (3) number of 
collective bargaining agreements, and (4) number of different employ¬ 
ers covered by agreements. 
In studies reviewed, the quantity measure of size consisted of 
the number of employees. In a voluntary or ’mutual-benefit1 associ¬ 
ation,^ the client or member should be the primary beneficiary of 
the organization's activities. Consequently, number of members 
(clients) would be the comparable organization or system size measure 
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in a labor union. Due to the complexities of tabulating union 
membership (lack of uniformity in reporting, multiple counting, and 
incomplete information),^ this study will utilize the concept of 
annual 'average dues-paying membership' as a measure of membership 
size. Size in terms of the number of members apparently has certain 
consequences for the distance between the rank and file and top 
leadership, formal communication links and channels,^ power 
structure, ° internal political processes, and intra-union 
conflict.^ 
Average local size provides an indication of the degree to 
which an organization is achieving economies of scale in its admini- 
stration. The minimum requisite size to develop an effective and 
efficient organization will undoubtedly vary from union to union, but 
its membership must be large enough to justify the employment of full- 
time officials. This applies at all levels of union organization. 
If scale economies are operative at the local level, the entire 
organization may be large enough for it to be functional at the 
23 
international level (central headquarters). 
Another approach to determining the size of an organization is 
to measure the results (output) of accomplishing its primary task. 
In a firm this could be ascertained by using total dollar sales or 
the number of product units produced. A primary task of a union is 
the negotiation of a union-management contract, the contract being 
the output. Therefore, the number of collective bargaining agreements 
will be another quantity measure of union size. 
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Scope as a measure of organization size relates to geographic 
area, share of the market, service area, or the degree to which 
organization units are spatially dispersed. The scope of a union can 
be measured in terms of jurisdiction (geographic area, number of firms 
or employers, type of work, industry, or occupation over which a union 
asserts a special interest). ^ Union jurisdiction (size) will be 
measured by the number of different employers covered by collective 
bargaining agreements. 
Measurements of Relative Administrative Size 
With several administrative groups and operational definitions 
of organization size, a number of administrative ratios can be pro¬ 
duced to provide measures of relative administrative size. The 
(total) number of administrative employees divided by the number of 
members could be one definition of administrative ratio. Other 
administrative ratios can be constructed by changing the denominator 
to number of contracts or employers. Sub-group administrative ratios 
for different organization levels can be derived by breaking down the 
numerator. For example, the regional clerical administrative ratio 
can be obtained by dividing the number of clerical employees at the 
regional level by the number of members. In formulating and testing 
hypotheses, the denominator or basis of the administrative ratio will 
remain constant, the number of members. The numerator will be sub¬ 
divided by organization level and by administrative category when 
testing for correlates of relative administrative size. 
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Organization Complexity and its Measurement 
As discussed in the previous chapter, complexity generally 
refers to the degree of internal differentiation of an organization 
and to the variability and heterogeneity of an organization’s task 
and economic environment. This definition will be adopted in this 
study. 
Three measures of internal (structural) differentiation will be 
used: (1) number of local unions, (2) number of intermediate bodies, 
and (3) number of departments. The number of local unions may not 
reflect the number of places at which union members work, but it, 
nevertheless, constitutes a measure of the spatial dispersion of 
members. The number of intermediate bodies indicates structural seg¬ 
mentation between local unions and central headquarters. Taking many 
different forms (joint council, regional office, legislative board, 
or skilled trade department) and serving a variety of functions 
(supervisory, service, legislative, or consultative), the intermediate 
body is a federated association of local unions. It operates to 
promote and achieve unity of effort in meeting internal and environ¬ 
mental demands. The number of technical and administrative depart¬ 
ments provides a measure of differentiation at central headquarters. 
The departments furnish executive officers with technical advice and 
information and handle the internal housekeeping activities of 
26 
finance and audit. 
The complexity of a union's task and economic environment will 
be measured by two sets of factors. The first set includes (1) 
65 
member's occupational diversity or specificity and (2) industrial 
diversity or specificity. Diversity or specificity (uniformity) of 
27 
members' occupations can be viewed as a dichotomous variable which 
no 
roughly distinguishes craft from industrially organized unions. 
Industrial diversity or specificity reflects the number of major 
industry groups in which union members are employed. Both measures 
29 can be determined by the formula; 
(EX)2 
where D represents occupational (industrial) diversity and X the 
number of members in a major occupation (industry). The larger the 
value of D, the greater the occupational (industrial) diversity. For 
example, a union with members in five occupations (industries) may 
have 80 per cent of its members in only one occupation (industry), 
whereas, in another union members may be equally distributed among 
the same number of occupations (industries), (a list of major 
occupations and industries can be found in Appendix A). 
The second set of factors contains measures of the complexity 
of a major union activity (task), collective bargaining. Collective 
bargaining involves the negotiation, administration, and interpre¬ 
tation of a union contract. If each local union bargains by itself 
with an employer, the central headquarters is not likely to become 
intimately involved. However, in multi-unit bargaining (bargaining 
among several locals of one or more international unions or two or 
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more internationals bargaining nationally) the central headquarters 
may coordinate the negotiating process. The extent to which the 
30 
central headquarters becomes involved may be an indication of the 
amount of activity coordination taking place. Four complexity (bar¬ 
gaining) -activity measures will be used to approximate the bargaining 
activity coordination performed by the central headquarters: (1) num¬ 
ber of contracts per one hundred local unions, (2) number of contracts 
per one hundred employers, (3) number of employers per one hundred 
local unions, and (4) bargaining level(s) at which contracts are 
negotiated. 
In regard to the first two complexity-activity measures, the 
smaller the ratio, the greater the activity coordination. If there 
are fewer than one hundred agreements per one hundred locals, it may 
indicate that two or more locals are coordinating their bargaining 
efforts. The larger the third ratio, the greater the activity 
coordination because one local may be negotiating with several 
employers. The last factor refers to the degree of centralization or 
decentralization in contract negotiations. Greater coordination of 
activities may be necessary in centralized bargaining. Six different 
bargaining structures or levels are designated to ascertain the 
degree of centralization in negotiations. These range from multi¬ 
employer (multi-plant) to single-employer (single-plant) negotia- 
tions (see Appendix A for a listing of the six bargaining levels). 
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Hypotheses to be Tested 
Following from discussions in Chapter II, four general 
hypotheses are formulated to link the variables of organization size 
and complexity to the relative size of the administrative component. 
Since the hypotheses cannot be directly tested, working or operational 
hypotheses are derived utilizing appropriate definitions. 
Hypothesis One--Organization Size 
General Hypothesis One 
The relative size of the administrative component decreases 
(at a constant rate) as the size of the organization increases. 
Three major groups and five sub-groups of working hypotheses 
can be extracted from the general hypothesis. These groups result 
from breaking down the dependent variable according to organization 
level and administrative category. The three major groups include 
(1) a combined (central headquarters plus regional) set of admini¬ 
strative ratios, (2) central headquarters administrative ratios, and 
(3) regional administrative ratios. The sub-groups contain (a) com¬ 
bined (heterogeneous) administrative ratios, (b) managerial ratios, 
(c) professional staff ratios, (d) organizer and representative ratios, 
and (e) clerical ratios. With four definitions of organization size 
already noted, sixty working hypotheses can be drawn from the general 
hypothesis. Only the first major group (combined central and regional 
administrative ratios) is presented and discussed (all others are 
noted in Appendix B). 
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Working Hypotheses--Organization Size 
(1) As the number of union members increases, the relative size 
of the administrative component will decrease at a constant rate. 
(2) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
relative size of the administrative component will decrease at a 
constant rate. 
(3) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increases, 
the relative size of the administrative component will decrease at a 
constant rate. 
(4) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the relative size of the administrative compo¬ 
nent will decrease at a constant rate. 
These hypotheses refer to the additive effects of organization 
size on relative administrative size. As previously noted, studies 
(Chapter II) investigating the relationship between organization size 
and various administrative ratios have produced a variety of results. 
However, much of the research supports the contention that relative 
administrative size decreases as organization size increases. The 
present argument suggests that many administrative activities stemming 
from increases in size may not be performed by the local union but 
may be shifted upward to higher organization levels (central head¬ 
quarters and regional offices). Larger unions may require propor¬ 
tionately fewer administrative workers than smaller unions for manag¬ 
ing their headquarters as well as for coordinating operations 
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throughout the organization. Due to economies of scale, it is also 
suggested that increases in union size may foster proportionate 
declines within the different components of administrative personnel 
at both organization levels. 
Hypothesis Two--Organization Complexity 
General Hypothesis Two 
The relative size of the administrative component increases 
(at a constant rate) as organization complexity increases. 
To test this hypothesis, three sets of working statements are 
developed which incorporate measures of structural differentiation, 
occupational and industrial diversity, and the complexity of contract 
negotiations, respectively. Within each set, three major groups and 
five sub-groups of working hypotheses can be defined using the same 
procedures as in the first general hypothesis. Only the first major 
group of each set is presented and discussed (see Appendix B for the 
remaining hypotheses). 
Working Hypotheses--Complexity--Structural Differentiation 
(1) As the number of local unions increases, the relative size 
of the administrative component will increase proportionately. 
(2) As the number of intermediate bodies increases, the relative 
size of the administrative component will increase proportionately. 
(3) As the number of technical and administrative departments 
(central headquarters) increases, the relative size of the 
administrative component will increase proportionately. 
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The intermediate body functions to link and reduce the 
administrative distance between the rank and file membership and the 
leadership of the international union. The structuring of these 
bodies varies from union to union and is shaped by many forces: 
32 
bargaining structure, size, diversity in constituencies, and others. 
In some unions there may be a different type of intermediate body for 
each major problem encountered by the union. This proliferation of 
intermediate units may dictate a major coordination effort by the 
central headquarters in solving problems which transcend many subunits. 
Unions with many local units may require more sophisticated informa¬ 
tion and communication systems and more comprehensive integrative 
mechanisms than unions with few locals. Accordingly, with a larger 
number of local and intermediate units, the greater the need for 
additional administrative employees to effect coordination. 
To aid locals and intermediate bodies, technical and administra¬ 
tive assistance may be provided by central headquarters through 
various departments. These include law, research, education, account¬ 
ing and finance, publications, data processing, public relations, and 
so on. As with the local and intermediate units, the assumption is 
that the greater the number of departments, the greater the need for 
coordination and therefore a larger administrative component. 
Working Hypotheses--Complexity--Occupational Diversity 
(1) As the occupational diversity of the membership increases, 
the relative size of the administrative component will increase at a 
constant rate 
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(2) As the industrial diversity of the membership increases, 
the relative size of the administrative component will increase at 
a constant rate. 
These hypotheses are approached by considering the number of 
occupations (industries) in which members are employed and the dis¬ 
tribution of members throughout these occupations (industries). If 
members are concentrated in only one major occupation (industry), 
the assumption can be advanced that members' occupations (industries) 
are relatively uniform (occupational or industrial specificity). The 
opposite assumption is offered if the members are equally distributed 
among several occupations (occupational or industrial diversity). 
With greater diversity, unions nay be confronted with many different 
bargaining issues and a greater variety of organizing and servicing 
problems. To contend with these problems, a larger number of 
administrative employees may be required. 
Working Hypotheses--Complexity--Contract Negotiations 
(\) As the contracts/locals ratio decreases, the relative size 
of the administrative component will increase at a constant rate. 
(2) As the contracts/employers ratio decreases, the relative 
size of the administrative component will increase at a constant rate. 
(3) As the employers/locals ratio increases, the relative size 
of the administrative component will increase at a constant rate. 
(4) As the centralization of contract negotiations increases, 
the relative size of the administrative component will increase at a 
constant rate. 
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With these hypotheses, it can be argued that unions which 
engage in multi-plant, company-wide, industry-wide, regional, or 
national contract negotiations are more likely to make greater use 
of administrative employees. As contract negotiations become more 
centralized, there may be greater need for a larger administrative 
component at regional offices and central headquarters because activ¬ 
ity coordination may become more difficult. 
To test the fourth hypothesis, weights ranging from one to one 
hundred thousand will be assigned to the six bargaining levels. These 
weights will be multiplied by the percentage of contracts negotiated 
at the various levels and then summed to provide a bargaining cen¬ 
trality index. For example, if a union negotiates an equal percentage 
of contracts at each level,* the index would be calculated as follows: 
1 (.1667) + 10 (.1667) + 100 (.1667) + 1000 (.1667) + 
10,000 (.1667) + 100,000 (.1667) = 18,522 
The largest weight is assigned to the national multi-employer 
negotiations level because a contract negotiated at this level is 
likely to cover a larger number of union members than one negotiated 
at the single-employer local negotiations level. 
*In order of increasing bargaining centralization, the levels 
are (1) local single-plant, (2) local company-wide single-employer, 
(3) company-wide single-employer and local, (4) regional multi¬ 
employer and local, (5) national multi-employer and local, and 
(6) national multi-employer. 
Hypothesis Three--Organization Size and Complexity 
General Hypothesis Three 
As the complexity of the organization increases, the size of 
the organization will increase at a proportionate rate. 
With four size definitions and nine complexity factors, 
thirty-six working statements can be developed by matching each size 
and complexity measure. To be brief, only the first size measure and 
the first complexity definition (of the three sets of complexity 
measures) are combined to form working hypotheses (see Appendix B). 
Working Hypotheses--Size and Complexity 
(1) As the number of union members increases, the number of 
local unions will increase at a proportionate rate. 
(2) As the number of union members increases, the occupational 
diversity of the membership will increase at a proportionate rate. 
(3) As the number of union members increases, the contracts/ 
locals ratio will decrease at a proportionate rate. 
Considerable theoretical and empirical knowledge (Chapter II) 
is available to support the contention that size and complexity are 
directly connected. It can be argued that as a union expands its 
membership and bargains with an increasing number of employers, it 
may establish additional local units, represent a more diverse con¬ 
stituency, and develop more complex (multi-local or multi-employer) 
bargaining procedures. A small, relatively simple-structured union 
operating in one product class may eventually become a conglomerate 
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union representing hundreds of thousands of members in almost every 
occupation and industry. 
Hypothesis Four--Size-Complexity Interaction 
General Hypothesis Four 
The interaction effect of complexity with size will decrease 
the relative size of the administrative component as organization 
size increases. 
As with the third general hypothesis, size and complexity 
measures can be matched to produce a number of working statements. 
Also, the dependent variable can be sub-divided according to organi¬ 
zation level and administrative category to further expand the number 
of working hypotheses. The following statements reflect only one 
size measure and the first complexity definition of each set of 
complexity factors and the entire administrative staff (both levels 
and all groups) - (see Appendix B). 
Working Hypotheses--Size-Complexity Interaction 
(1) The interaction effect of the number of local unions with 
the number of union members will decrease the relative size of the 
administrative component as the number of union members increases. 
(2) The interaction effect of occupational diversity with the 
number of union members will decrease the relative size of the 
administrative component as the number of union members increases. 
(3) The interaction effect of the contracts/locals ratio with 
the number of union members will decrease the relative size of the 
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administrative component as the number of union members increases. 
With the exception of one study, research evidence indicated 
that size and complexity interact to suppress the direct effect of 
complexity on relative administrative size. Increases in size 
apparently reduce administrative ratios more than increases in 
complexity enlarge them. This tendency also may be exhibited by 
unions. 
Statistical Methods for Analysis of Data 
The variables in this study are continuous in form which allows 
the use of regression analysis as the basic method for investigating 
their interrelations. Through regression analysis and testing of the 
partial regression coefficients and the overall regression, the 
direction and degree of significance of the variables as set forth 
in the working hypotheses can be determined. Simple linear regression 
provides a relationship between a dependent variable and one inde¬ 
pendent variable. With several independent variables, the regression 
equation takes the form 
Y = Bq + + B2X2 + B3X3 + B4X4 + E 
where the values represent 
Y = relative administrative size 
B's = the coefficients 
X^ = number of union members 
X2 - average local size (average membership) 
X^-= number of contracts 
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= number of employers covered by contracts 
E = the residuals 
In the regression applications, student t-tests will be employed 
to test whether the beta (B's) coefficients (slopes) are significantly 
different from zero. The ? ratio will be used as an overall test of 
the significance of the regression and as a partial test to determine 
the significance of different groups of regressors. To check for 
serial auto correlation of the residuals from the regression, the 
Turbin-Vatson ’d' statistic will be used. 
In addition to testing the beta coefficients, correlation 
analysis will be utilized to find the association between two vari¬ 
ables one decendent and one independent) and the relationships of 
several independent factors to one dependent variable. The partial 
correlation coefficient r) provides a measure of the relationship 
between two variables with the effect of one or more other variables 
removed. The multiple correlation coefficient (3.) represents the 
simple correlation coefficient between the actual values of the depen- 
variable and those values estimated from the multiple regression 
function. The coefficient of determination (3. ) reveals tr.e per- 
jof the variation in the dependent variable which is accounted 
for mr the regression. Tot exam 1 e, an 2/ value of .950 indicates 
j- uhe imdecemdemt factors as a whole explain 95 per cent of tne 
33 
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Since the interpretation or meaning attached to correlation 
coefficients is not a standardized procedure and is dependent upon 
the situation and the judgment of the investigator, a minimum level 
of significance will be determined before completing calculations. 
The values of r and R for the .05 and .01 levels of significance will 
vary with the sample size and the number of independent variables. 
Sample Elements and Data Collection Procedures — + - - ■ ■ ■. — . ... - - — - . - ... -- - . - . . . 
The study will be confined to international (central) head¬ 
quarters of unions with 10,000 members or more. According to the 
Directory of National and International Labor Unions in the United 
States and its supplements, there are 120 national or international 
3^ 
unions that satisfy this membership requirement. To reduce the 
field work to manageable proportions and to eliminate widely scattered 
interviews, the sampled population will be restricted to unions 
located in Washington, D.C., New York City, and Boston. Seventy 
unions meet this requirement. Judgmental or purposive sampling will 
be utilized to select thirty of the seventy unions according to the 
following criteria: (1) membership size; (2) diversity of members' 
occupations; (3) kinds of industries dealt with; (4) type of union; 
(5) pattern of contract negotiations; (6) existence of intermediate 
bodies; and (7) willingness to cooperate in the study and accessi¬ 
bility. The aim will be to obtain a cross-section of unions in order 
to capture an adequate range of variables under study. 
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Interviews with union administrators, documents, and statistical 
records will constitute the primary sources of data. Interviews with 
either international union presidents, research directors, education 
specialists, or other officials will be the most important data 
sources. The interviews will take place at the central headquarters 
of the union. Including the time it will take to develop rapport 
with the respondent and explain the goals of the study, each inter¬ 
view should take no longer than an hour and one half. To solicit the 
necessary information, a lengthy, structured questionnaire (see 
Appendix A) will be used to guide the interview and record information. 
A copy of the questionnaire will be handed to the respondent at the 
beginning of the interview to enhance understanding and ease of 
response. 
Union constitutions, organization charts, and personnel reports 
are documents that will furnish information on administrative posi¬ 
tions, organization structures, and the number of administrators. 
Statistical records that may be of value are summaries of collective 
bargaining coverage and membership. Supplementing these sources will 
be published documents of the Department of Labor. 
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, operational definitions of relative 
administrative size, organization size, and organization complexity 
Were developed and used to formulate several sets of working 
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hypotheses. These working statements stemmed from four general 
hypothesis: 
(1) The relative size of the administrative component decreases 
(at a constant rate) as the size of the organization increases, 
(2) The relative size of the administrative component increases 
(at a constant rate) as organization complexity increases. 
(3) As the complexity of the organization increases, the size 
of the organization will increase at a proportionate rate, 
(4) The interaction effect of complexity with size will decrease 
the relative size of the administrative component as organization size 
increases. 
Since the variables are in continuous form, regression and 
correlation analyses will be employed to evaluate the working hypothe¬ 
ses. Each working statement can be expressed as a multiple regression 
equation. 
Data will be gathered from union officials at each headquarters 
organization through interviews and a structured questionnaire. 
Supportive union documents and published government reports will also 
be used. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
This chapter includes results of data collection and analysis 
accompanied by supportive figures and tables. The chapter will be 
divided into three areas of discussion: (1) data collection, indi¬ 
cating when and where data gathering took place; (2) sample charac¬ 
teristics, noting the range of membership sizes and the types of 
unions included in the sample; and (3) testing of hypotheses, 
analyzing and interpreting the results of the hypotheses presented 
in the previous chapter. 
Data Collection 
Initial contacts were made with officials of national and 
international labor unions through the assistance of the Labor Rela¬ 
tions and Research Center of the University of Massachusetts. The 
Center frequently contacts and is contacted by officials from many 
international unions. With the aid of the Center's Director, a letter 
of introduction was developed to inform the respondent of the purposes 
of the study, explain the method of research, and encourage 
participation (see Appendix C). 
On November 27, 1971, the letter of introduction and a stamped, 
self-addressed envelope were mailed to a union official (president, 
secretary-treasurer, research director, or education director) known 
by the Center's Director in each of 70 unions. Each official was 
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requested to indicate his willingness to participate (or not to 
participate) in the study at the bottom of the letter and return it. 
To those unions for which no responses were received, follow-up letters 
(see Appendices D and E) were mailed on December 9 and 24, 1971. 
Response to Letter of Introduction 
The first mailing resulted in the return of 38 letters, or 54 
per cent response. With the second and third mailings, an additional 
20 letters were received making a total return of 58, for an overall 
percentage of 83. Of the 58 returned letters, 33 unions (57 per cent 
of returns) indicated their willingness to participate in the research. 
According to union position, the 33 positive respondents were dis¬ 
tributed as follows: President (7), secretary-treasurer (5), research 
director (17), and education director (4). For an analysis of each 
mailing stage by position and response, see Table 4-1. 
Data collection was conducted through personal visits to the 
headquarters organizations of 30 unions during the first half of 1972 
(exact dates were January 5 through 14, April 13, 14, and 15, and 
June 5 and 6, 1972). A letter (see Appendix F) and telephone call 
establishing an appointment preceded each visit. A structured 
questionnaire (see Appendix A), designed to elicit mostly objective 
data, was used to guide the interview and record information. An 
interview with one official usually was sufficient to obtain the 
required data. Occasionally, another official or secretary was 
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agreement, membership report, yearly bargaining and organizing report, 
or organization chart) skimmed, or an employee directory examined to 
locate information not readily known by the official. The time 
required to complete each interview ranged from one hour to two hours. 
Characteristics of the Sample Elements 
In Chapter III several criteria were established to guide the 
selection of unions to be included in the sample. The last criterion 
(willingness to cooperate in the study and accessibility) became the 
most important, since arrangements could be made to visit only 30 of 
the 33 unions which agreed to participate. However, the sample 
included unions ranging in size from 10,000 to 1,200,000 members, and 
it contained an equal number of craft and industrial'*' unions (see 
Table 4-2). With the exception of two unions, one or more types of 
intermediate bodies (usually a number of regional offices) were 
integral parts of union structures. The unions displayed an adequate 
range of variance in members' occupational diversity (specificity) 
and industrial diversity (specificity). Also, different patterns 
(complexity) of contract negotiations were observed (see Appendices 
G through L for presentations of the raw data). 
Testing of Hypotheses 
Levels of Statistical Significance 
The statistical methods for investigating the relationships 
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In the regression applications, t and F tests were used to determine 
the significance of relationships between two or more variables. The 
values of t and F which denoted levels of significance varied accord¬ 
ing to sample size and the number of independent factors in the 
regression equation. For example, with a sample size of 30 and four 
independent variables in the equation, the significant F values at 
the .01 and .05 levels were 4.18 and 2.76 respectively (with 4 degrees 
of freedom in the numerator of the F ratio and 25 degrees of freedom 
in the denominator) . The F values for an equation with only two 
independent factors (2 degrees of freedom in the numerator and 27 
degrees of freedom in the denominator) increased to 5.49 and 3.35 for 
the .01 and .05 levels of significance. 
As mentioned in Chapter III, the interpretation or meaning 
attached to various correlation coefficients was not a standardized 
procedure and was dependent upon the situation and the judgment of the 
researcher. Therefore, a minimum level of acceptance was determined 
according to the sample size. With a sample of 30 elements, the 
correlation values at the .01 and .05 levels of significance were 
.456 and .355 respectively. Even a minimum acceptable correlation 
value was not necessarily an indicator of the degree of relationship 
between two factors; consequently, three categories showing degrees 
of closeness seemed appropriate in analyzing the nature of a relation¬ 
ship. The relationship between any independent variable and relative 
administrative size was described as being 'high' if the correlation 
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coefficient had a value of .60 or greater; 'medium' or 'moderate' 
was the description if the value ranged from .30 to .59; and 'low' 
2 
or 'weak' referred to a value less than ,30o 
Acceptance or Rejection of General Hypotheses 
For each general hypothesis, several groups and sub-groups of 
working hypotheses were derived. These groups contained a large 
number of working statements and resulted from sub-dividing the 
dependent variable according to organization level and administrative 
category. In order to accept a general hypothesis, significant 
correlation coefficients (values which exceeded the minimum accep¬ 
tance level) had to be obtained from the tests of at least half of 
the working statements. 
Data Presentation and Discussion of Results 
General Hypothesis One 
The relative size of the administrative component decreases 
(at a constant rate) as the size of the organization increases. 
In testing the working statements extracted from this general 
hypothesis, few significant relationships were uncovered. The 
heterogeneous (all administrative groups) administrative ratios for 
the central headquarters organization, regional offices, and combined 
central and regional offices were not associated with any of the 
measures of organization size (number of union members, average local 
membership, number of contracts, and number of employers). However, 
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one of the administrative sub-group (managers and administrators) 
ratios was significantly connected with the first measure of size 
(number of members). While the relationship between the proportion 
of top managers and the number of union members was statistically 
significant (see Table 4-3) , the scatter diagram (Figure 4-1) revealed 
a negative regression line with a convex curve. This indicated that 
the decline in the managerial ratio occurred at a decreasing rate 
very rapidly for unions with up to about 175,000 members, but for 
larger unions, the ratio declined more gradually. The curvilinear 
relationship was exhibited at both the central headquarters and 
regional levels of the organization. 
Of the remaining size definitions, moderate relationships were 
obtained from correlations between number of contracts and employers 
and the per cent of top administrators (see Table 4-3). These rela¬ 
tionships were also negative and approximated convex curves (see 
Figures 4-2 and 4-3). The rate of decline of the central managerial 
ratio fell substantially for unions with up to about 1600 contracts 
and for unions dealing with about 8000 employers, beyond these points 
the rate of decline was more gradual and leveled off. 
Another relationship, while not statistically significant 
(see Table 4-4), also illustrated a curvilinear association (see 
Figure 4-4). The proportion of professional employees at the head¬ 
quarters organization declined rapidly up to about 200,000 members, 
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Other than the relationships mentioned above, there were no 
significant connections between measures of organization size and 
relative administrative size at the headquarters or regional levels 
of organization. Apparently, union size has little impact upon the 
relative size of the administrative component. Therefore, general 
hypothesis one cannot be accepted. 
Discussion of Results--General Hypothesis One 
With the exception of the managerial ratio, the above findings 
indicate that organization size may not be a significant variable 
when analyzing the size of the administrative proportion of labor 
unions. The smaller proportion of top administrators in larger unions 
and the lack of an association between the other administrative groups 
and organization size suggests four explanatory factors: (1) the 
major activities (collective bargaining, organizing, education, 
research, etc.) of most labor unions may be very similar; (2) major 
activity decisions and policy formulations are likely to be made 
(with the consent of the membership) by only one or a few officials 
(president, secretary-treasurer, and executive board); (3) the semi- 
autonomous or relatively independent status of local unions 
apparently does not require an extensive supervisory and control 
system; and (4) large unions may not allocate their greater financial 
resources to enlarging the clerical and consultative staffs. 
As long as unions engage in a similar number and set of major 
activities, each union will need a minimum number of administrative 
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employees to perform these tasks. For some of these activities the 
minimum number of administrative employees may have little or no 
relationship to the size of the union, since one or two employees 
can probably perform an activity in a union of 100,000 members as 
easily as in a union of 10,000 members. For example, one or two 
professional staff employees can probably write, edit, and take care 
of the printing and distribution of a monthly union news letter in 
a large as well as a small union. In addition, some major activities 
(legal representation and publications) may be performed by outside 
agencies through a sub-contracting or retainer arrangement in both 
large and small unions. 
In Chapter I, several forces were discussed as administrative 
centralizing tendencies in unions. Coupling these forces with the 
considerable constitutional power granted to many union executives, 
it becomes apparent that few administrative limitations are placed 
upon top union officials. The union executive may have virtually 
unrestricted authority in directing the affairs of the union. Con¬ 
sequently, there may be little need for an elaborate administrative 
network. 
International unions are federations of many local unions. 
Each local develops a constitution and elects or appoints member 
officials to enforce and administer the constitution. Even though 
a local may be obligated to conform to the international's consti¬ 
tution and follow the directives of the international officers, the 
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local may have relatively infrequent dealings with the international. 
Therefore, an extensive supervisory and control system may not be 
required. During certain periods (contract negotiations) and under 
emergency conditions (strikes or lockouts), however, local unions 
may develop very intimate (though temporary) associations with the 
central headquarters. On these occasions, close supervision may be 
necessary. 
The financial resources of an international union are derived 
through assessments of affiliated local unions and their members. 
These assessments vary from union to union, but generally larger 
unions will have greater financial resources than smaller unions. In 
providing various services to local unions and performing administra¬ 
tive tasks, larger unions may employ their greater financial resour¬ 
ces to lease or purchase automated information processing equipment 
instead of hiring additional administrative employees. 
General Hypothesis Two 
The relative size of the administrative component increases 
(at a constant rate) as organization complexity increases. 
Structural Differentiation 
The more differentiated (complex) the formal structure of 
labor unions, the greater the number of administrators needed to 
manage union affairs. Only one of the administrative group ratios 
was significantly affected by structural complexity (see Tables 4-5 




































































































































CL cd -O 
•r-l r—4 o 
4-1 <U vO 







<U 4-1 cd cd 
i—i cd r'- CM m 
O-i t-4 in <1" 
e cu • • • 

















co r- in 
•H vO o r- 
4-1 o • • • 









CO 1 O 4-> 
i—4 5-i PQ 5-i 
cd <U cd 
o 4-1 <U CL d 
Q 0 4-1 <u o 
4-1 H4 cd Q CO 
e •H 4-1 
<u <u 4-4 4-4 nd 4-1 cd 
•X) i-l O O cu O s 
0 £> £ 1 
<u cd i-i 5-i 54 0 
0< *i-4 cu <U (U •t-4 
<U 54 -o rO -O 
Td cd E Q E 5-i 
c > o 9 9 0 












































































































































































































r- r- i—i 
co co co 
• • • 



































CO i O ■P 
i—l 5-i pq 5-i 
cO <U cO 
O 4-1 <u CL 
Q G 4-J <U 
4-1 M CO Q 
c •H 
<u <u M-l 14-1 T) 4-1 
T3 r-i o O (U O 
G X> 
<U CO 5-i U 
6 
U 
CL *H <U Q) <u 
<U M xi X* 
T3 cO g E g 
G > 3 3 G 






















direction from that proposed. The headquarters managerial ratio 
(see Figures 4-5, 4-6, and 4-7) and the combined headquarters and 
regional managerial ratio (see Figures 4-8, 4-9, and 4-10) tended 
to decline rapidly as the number of local unions, intermediate bodies, 
and departments increased. The ratio declined more gradually and 
leveled off beyond about 600 local unions, 25 intermediate bodies, 
and 6 departments. 
There were no significant correlations between measures of 
structural differentiation and the other administrative group ratios, 
but many of the scatter diagrams revealed a tendency for the ratios 
to drop as complexity increased. For example, the combined head¬ 
quarters and regional clerical ratio decreased as the number of 
intermediate bodies increased (see Figure 4-11). The regional organ¬ 
izer ratio displayed a downward trend when the number of intermediate 
bodies increased (see Figure 4-12). 
Occupational and Industrial Diversity 
No significant relationships were obtained between any of the 
administrative ratios and measures of occupational and industrial 
diversity. Apparently the number of occupations (industries) in 
which members worked and the distribution of members among these 
occupations (industries) had little, if any, effect on the relative 
size of the administrative component. Figures 4-13 and 4-14 are 
representative of the lack of a relationship between these 









Wtf H<^ HHO 



































































































































































































s<sz;<2owc*:w<ch4 C*J <J H M O 

















































































































































































































2<z<:owpiH<^ pi < h m o 

















































































































a < z < o u Pi h<; j pi <1 H H O 
















































































































OiJukshuchI »; < h h o 

























































































































































































































































































































































^^OfeWWWHOZ<»J < H M O 






































































Complexity of the Bargaining Process 
Of the four measures of bargaining complexity (major activity 
coordination), only the bargaining centrality index appeared to have 
any relation to measures of relative administrative size. A strong 
positive association existed between the regional managerial ratio 
(see Table 4-7 and Figure 4-15) and the combined central and regional 
managerial ratio (see Table 4-8 and Figure 4-16) and the bargaining 
centrality index. Unions which negotiate on a regional or national 
multi-employer basis apparently require a larger proportion of top 
administrators. However, as can be seen from Figures 4-15 and 4-16, 
one union appeared to dominate this relationship. If this union 
were eliminated from the analysis, the association may not be as 
strong. 
Very few significant relationships were found between measures 
of organization complexity and relative administrative size. Most 
of the relationships that did exist were not in the direction 
hypothesized. Apparently, there was little or no relationship 
between the complexity of labor unions and the proportion of people 
involved in union administrative activities. Thus, general 
hypothesis two cannot be accepted. 
Discussion of Results--General Hypothesis Two 
The analysis of this hypothesis produced inconsistent findings. 
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managerial ratio in contrasting ways. The managerial ratio declined 
with increasing structural differentiation and increased with greater 
centralization (complexity) of the bargaining (negotiations) process. 
Aside from these findings, no other significant associations were 
uncovered between measures of relative administrative size and organ¬ 
ization complexity. This general lack of a relationship between 
complexity and the administrative proportion suggests that five 
explanatory variables may be involved (1) most of the activity 
coordination and handling of members' problems takes place within 
the local union; (2) coordination may be through personal contact 
rather than rules and written communications; (3) historically, 
unions have attempted to standardize the employment relationship 
through similar wages, hours, and working conditions regardless of 
the location and qualifications of the individual; (4) labor unions 
may be viewed as voluntary associations; and (5) the tendency for 
some unions to reduce structural differentiation by eliminating 
intermediate bodies and merging of locals. 
Bargaining for changes in work rules, soliciting new members, 
and adjusting grievances are primarily local union activities which 
take place on a continuous basis. International union officials may 
be consulted only infrequently on these matters. Other activities, 
such as dues collection and maintaining seniority rosters, are fre¬ 
quently performed by management. Hence, there may be little need 
for a large administrative component at the central headquarters or 
regional office to coordinate these activities. 
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Another factor explaining the relatively small administrative 
apparatus in labor unions may be that many activities are accomplished 
through face-to-face interaction. The coordinative mechanism may be 
personal contact rather than a rule or document. As one moves up the 
union hierarchy from local to regional office to central headquarters, 
coordination may become less personal, but there may still be many 
occasions when the presence of an international representative at 
the bargaining table or on the plant floor will result in the 
expeditious handling of a management-union problem. 
Over the years, unions have attempted to standardize the wage 
and effort bargain within their respective jurisdictions. The greater 
the degree of standardization in the employment contract and rela¬ 
tionship, the less the need for a large administrative component to 
supervise and control various union activities. 
Even though a labor union may be described as a voluntary 
organization, employees may be obligated to join the union under the 
terms of a collective bargaining agreement. However, only a small 
portion of the members may actively engage in union activities. With 
few members participating in the union, it may not be difficult to 
coordinate (integrate) the actions of almost all members with a 
relatively small number of administrative employees. 
When gathering the information for this study, officials of 
several unions mentioned programs that had been developed to encourage 
and facilitate the merger of locals and to reduce the number of 
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intermediate bodies. These changes would presumably simplify union 
structure and reduce problems of coordination. 
General Hypothesis Three 
As the complexity of the organization increases, the size of 
the organization will increase at a proportionate rate. 
The data analysis revealed several significant associations 
between measures of organization size and complexity (see Table 4-9). 
The relationships are discussed in groups below. 
Organization Size and Structural Differentiation 
Three definitions of organization size were closely associated 
with the three measures of structural complexity. The highest 
correlation occurred between the number of union members and the 
number of local unions (see Figure 4-17). From Figures 4-18 and 
4-19, the larger a union was (by number of members), the greater the 
number of departments and intermediate bodies it contained. Mod¬ 
erate to high relationships were also found between the number of 
contracts and employers and definitions of structural complexity 
(see Figures 4-20, 4-21, 4-22, 4-23, 4-24, and 4-25). 
At this point, the intercorrelations among the size measures 
and structural complexity factors should be reported. The number of 
union members was highly associated with the number of collective 
bargaining agreements (.72) and moderately related to number of 
employers (.52). Low degrees of correlation existed between average 
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TABLE 4-9 
VALUE OF CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS COMPUTED 
BETWEEN MEASURES OF ORGANIZATION SIZE AND 
MEASURES OF ORGANIZATION COMPLEXITY 
N = 30 
Correlation Between Coefficient 
Number of Union Members and: 
Number of Local Unions .84^ 
Number of Departments . 72^ 
Number of Intermediate Bodies .63^ 
Occupational Diversity .22 




Bargaining Centrality Index .15 
Average Local Size and: 
Number of Local Unions -.21 
Number of Departments .31 
Number of Intermediate Bodies -.10 
Occupational Diversity .06 




Bargaining Centrality Index -.12 
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TABLE 4-9--continued 
Correlation Between Coefficient 
Number of Contracts and: 
Number of Local Unions 
Number of Departments 
















Number of Employers and: 
Number of Local Unions 
Number of Departments 
















d/f - 29 r .456 r#05 
Significant at the .05 level 

















































































































































































































































































































































































local size and number of members (.13), number of contracts (.25), 
and number of employers (.08). A close association occurred 
between number of contracts and number of employers (.62). 
With regard to measures of structural differentiation, the 
number of locals was moderately related to the number of departments 
(.50) and highly associated with the number of intermediate bodies 
(.64). The analysis produced a low moderate relationship between 
number of departments and number of intermediate bodies (.31). 
Organization Size and Occupational and Industrial Diversity 
Correlations indicating a relationship between occupational 
diversity and number of members (.22) and number of contracts (.12) 
were considered weak. Moderate correlations were computed between 
industrial diversity and number of members and number of contracts 
(see Figures 4-26 and 4-27). Industrial diversity was moderately 
associated with occupational diversity (.31). 
Organization Size and Complexity of Bargaining Process 
In five of sixteen computations between measures of size and 
bargaining complexity, correlation analysis yielded values which 
exceeded the .05 acceptance level of .355. Moderate relationships 
were obtained from correlations between the contracts/locals ratio 
and average local size (see Figure 4-28), number of contracts and 
the contracts/locals ratio (see Figure 4-29), number of contracts 




































































































































































































































































employers and the contracts/employers ratio (see Figure 4-31). 
With the exception of the last moderate relationship, the associa¬ 
tions were positive. A very close association resulted from the 
correlation between number of employers and the employers/locals 
ratio (see Figure 4-32). 
Only two significant intercorrelations occurred among the 
bargaining complexity measures. A moderate positive connection 
(.54) existed between the contracts/locals ratio and the employers/ 
locals ratio. The association between the contracts/employers 
ratio and the employers/locals ratio was moderate and negative 
(-.46). 
Significant moderate to high relationships were obtained 
between measures of organization size and complexity in 16 of 36 
computations. Following the decision rule established earlier in 
the chapter of accepting only those general hypotheses in which at 
least one half of the working hypotheses yielded significant 
associations, general hypothesis three cannot be accepted. 
Discussion of Results—General Hypothesis Three 
Despite a number of statistically significant associations, 
the findings concerning this hypothesis were inconclusive. Larger 
unions didn't consistently display a tendency to be more complex. 
Associations between size and complexity indicators appeared to be 
































































































relationship between size and structural differentiation and very 
weak to non-existent associations between size and the other groups 
of complexity measures (industrial and occupational diversity and 
collective bargaining complexity). Accordingly, these findings 
raise doubts about the proposition that large organizations are more 
complex than small organizations. 
One inference of these findings is that structural complexity 
may be implied from knowledge of organization size. This study 
partially supports previous evidence (refer to Chapter II) which 
revealed a strong positive relationship between size and structural 
configuration and differentiation. However, a word of caution 
accompanies this evaluation. While size indicators were similar 
among the studies (including this one), the measures of structural 
complexity varied in number and character. Comparisons of results 
across different types of organizations and definitions of complex¬ 
ity become ambiguous and conclusions can only be very tentative. 
When standardized measures of the organizational attributes under 
study become available, firmer conclusions will undoubtedly be 
drawn. 
No clear implications can be formulated from the correlations 
between union size and complexity of task and industrial environ¬ 
ments. Of eight computations involving size indicators and measures 
of occupational and industrial diversity, only two approached 
significance. Apparently, larger unions (measured by members and 
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contracts) engage in collective bargaining activities in a greater 
number of industries and members are more equally distributed among 
these industries. However, there is an important limiting factor 
which minimizes the significance of this association. The relation¬ 
ship between industrial diversity and occupational diversity was not 
statistically significant. It would seem that if a union organized 
workers in many industries, it necessarily would have drawn members 
from a number of major occupational groups. On the other hand, 
even if a union had an occupationally diverse membership, the over¬ 
whelming majority of members might be concentrated in only one 
major occupation. 
With regard to the relationships between size and the 
complexity-collective bargaining activity measures, the results 
were inconsistent and contradictory. An assumption underlying the 
hypothesis was that greater activity coordination would be associa¬ 
ted with smaller contracts/locals and contracts/employers ratios. 
Smaller ratios would indicate that two or more locals were 
coordinating their bargaining efforts. 
Significant positive associations were obtained between size 
indicators (average local size and number of contracts) and the 
contracts/locals ratio. This would suggest that unions with larger 
locals and a greater number of contracts may experience less diffi¬ 
culty in coordinating contract negotiations. The data analysis 
produced negative correlation coefficients between the contracts/ 
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employers ratio and size measures. Only one correlational value 
(between number of employers and the contracts/employers ratio) was 
statistically significant. This relationship would mean that 
unions which deal with a greater number of employers experience 
greater difficulty in coordinating bargaining activities. Appar¬ 
ently, these two activity ratios are different indicators of 
collective bargaining complexity since their connections with union 
size are in opposite directions and they are uncorrelated. 
To further complicate the interpretation of these results, 
positive connections were obtained between size indicators and the 
employers/locals ratio. Two associations were above the .01 level 
of significance. The higher this complexity-activity ratio, the 
greater the degree of activity coordination which may be required. 
For example, a group of five locals may coordinate their bargaining 
with 100 employers. These unions would have to obtain considerable 
information from as many as 100 different groups of employees and 
work sites in order to develop a strong bargaining program. This 
may create a complex information gathering and exchange system. 
According to the results, larger unions apparently must contend 
with greater bargaining activity coordination than smaller unions. 
General Hypothesis Four 
The Interaction effect of complexity with size will decrease 
the relative size of the administrative component as organization 
size Increases. 
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This hypothesis was tested using the following regression 
model: 
Y = Bq + BjX + B2X2 + B3XxX2 + E 
where the values represent 
Y = relative administrative size 
B's = the coefficients 
X-j^ = union size (number of members) 
X2 = complexity (number of locals) 
X-^X2 = interaction of size and complexity 
E = residuals 
The analysis included only those size and complexity variables 
which were significantly related to one another or to a measure of 
relative administrative size. Using various combinations of these 
factors, the above equation was computed several times. Only one 
interaction term approached statistical significance (see Table 4-10 
and Figure 4-33). 
As independent variables, the number of members and the number 
of locals were negatively associated with the central headquarters 
managerial ratio. The combined or interaction effect of these two 
factors on the managerial ratio produced a steep downward sloping 
curve which rapidly leveled (became horizontal) off at a managerial 
ratio of .000025. Consequently, the interactive influence of these 
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The above finding supports the general hypothesis, but all 
other interaction equations yielded insignificant values. There¬ 
fore, general hypothesis four cannot be accepted. 
Discussion of Results--General Hypothesis Four 
Three interpretations can be advanced for the findings (or 
lack of) concerning the interaction hypothesis. First, since some 
of the size and complexity definitions and one size-complexity 
interaction measure were similarly related to a limited number of 
measures of relative administrative size, a number of the size and 
complexity indicators may be measuring the same phenomenon, union 
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction (area of organization) of a union 
may consist of an entire industry, a skill or trade, a set of occu¬ 
pations, or a geographic area. A single measure of jurisdiction, 
rather than several measures of size and complexity, may explain to 
a greater extent why some unions have larger proportions of 
administrative employees. 
A second interpretation suggests that most unions utilize 
similar mechanisms of coordination regardless of size and degree of 
complexity. At the local union level, coordination may be achieved 
through personal means, influence and persuasion. Organizers and 
representatives, operating from regional offices, may bring about 
coordination through periodic interventions into local conflicts 
and issues and applying their expert knowledge. The international 
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union president promotes coordination via the administrative 
hierarchy and formal communication channels. 
As a third explanation of these results, there may be other 
independent variables and sets of factors which form relationships 
with definitions of relative administrative size. Some of these 
variables may intervene between the independent and dependent vari¬ 
ables of this study. Two behavioral factors might be the leadership 
style exhibited by the union's chief executive officer and the 
degree of apathy or lack of participation displayed by rank and file 
members. A dynamic and aggressive union president may surround 
himself with many professional experts and internal political allies 
and use this power base to maintain his position in the union. A 
high degree of membership apathy may encourage the development of a 
larger administrative component since fewer checks would be exerted 
on the power and authority of union officials. 
Another explanatory variable may be the differences in 
democratic procedures within unions. A union which elects its 
regional directors from their respective regions may contain larger 
regional administrative components. An elected regional director 
may have closer ties to his constituents and therefore attempt to 
more adequately meet their needs. He could accomplish this through 
employing a greater number of representatives and organizers. 
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Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, several sets of working hypotheses were 
statistically evaluated using regression and correlation analysis. 
These working statements represented four general hypotheses. 
Significant correlation coefficients had to be obtained from tests 
of at least half of the working statements in order to accept a 
general hypothesis. Following this decision rule, none of the gen¬ 
eral hypothetical relationships could be accepted. However, a 
number of the specific (working) hypotheses were supported. The 
following comprise a sample of these relationships: 
(1) The relative size of the managerial component decreases 
(rapidly and then leveled off) as the number of members, contracts, 
and employers increased. 
(2) The relative size of the managerial component decreased 
(rapidly and then leveled off) as the number of locals, intermediate 
bodies, and departments increased. 
(3) The relative size of the managerial component increased 
proportionately as the collective bargaining process became more 
centralized. 
(4) The number of locals, intermediate bodies, and departments 
Increased proportionately with the number of members, contracts, 
and employers. 
(5) Industrial diversity Increased proportionately with the 
number of members and contracts. 
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(6) Two measures of collective bargaining complexity 
(contracts/locals ratio and employers/locals ratio) increased 
proportionately with average local size, number of contracts, and 
number of employers; whereas, a third measure (contracts/employers 
ratio) decreased proportionately as the number of contracts and 
employers increased. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV 
■1-Jack Barbash, American Unions: Structure, Government, and 
Politics (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 7-25. 
2 
Leona E. Tyler, The Psychology of Human Differences (New 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965), p. 44. York: 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The research question of this study was to determine how the 
variables of organization size and complexity were linked to the 
relative size of the administrative component in a multi-level 
organizational system, national and international labor unions. 
To answer this question, a sample of 30 labor unions with 10,000 
members or more was surveyed. Union presidents, secretary-treasurers, 
research and education directors were asked a series of questions 
designed to elicit information concerning union size, structural 
differentiation, occupational and industrial distribution of the 
membership, and the complexity of the collective bargaining process. 
The data gathered were continuous in form which permitted the use of 
regression and correlation analysis for investigating the relation¬ 
ships among the variables. 
This final chapter of the study will (1) summarize the results 
which were presented in the preceding chapter; (2) seek to identify 
general implications of the study; (3) mention the study's limitations; 
and (4) enumerate possible future research projects on the structure 
and complexity of labor unions and other organizations. 
Results Summary 
From an analysis of the literature bearing on the research 
question, four general hypotheses were formulated for testing. A 
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number of operational definitions of organization size and complexity 
and relative administrative size were developed and used to enumerate 
several working hypotheses for each general hypothesis. Only the 
general hypotheses will be restated in summarizing the results. 
General Hypothesis One 
The relative size of the administrative component decreases 
(at a constant rate) as the size of the organization increases. 
The dependent variable in this hypothesis and the second and 
fourth hypotheses was decomposed according to organization level 
(central headquarters and regional office) and administrative category 
(managers and administrators, professional staff experts, organizers 
and representatives, and clerical workers). Union size was measured 
by the number of members, average local membership, number of labor 
agreements, and number of employers dealt with. 
No association was uncovered between the heterogeneous (all 
administrative groups) measure of relative administrative size and 
union size. However, one administrative group ratio (managers and 
administrators) was significantly linked to the number of members, 
labor agreements, and employers. In all three cases, the relationship 
was negative and formed a downward sloping curve which eventually 
leveled off. 
The above findings were not sufficient for accepting the 
general hypothesis. Apparently, there is little or no relationship 
between union size and the relative size of union administrative 
components. 
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General Hypothesis Two 
The relative size of the administrative component increases 
(at a constant rate) as organization complexity increases. 
Organization complexity can be defined in terms of an 
organization's internal differentiation and the variability and 
heterogeneity of its task and economic environment. Number of local 
unions, intermediate bodies, and departments at the central head¬ 
quarters provided measures of internal (structural) differentiation. 
Each of these measures was significantly related to the managerial 
ratio. No other measure of relative administrative size was 
associated with structural complexity. 
Two sets of factors were used to measure the complexity of 
unions' task and economic environments. The first set included 
measures of the number of occupations and industries in which members 
worked and the distribution of members among these occupations and 
industries. No significant associations were found between any of 
the administrative ratios and these two measures. 
The second set of indicators contained measures of the 
complexity of a major union activity (task), collective bargaining. 
Three bargaining-activity ratios (contracts/locals, contracts/ 
employers, and employers/locals) and a bargaining centrality index 
were used in testing this hypothesis. The data analysis produced 
only one significant relationship. A strong positive association 
existed between the managerial ratio (regional and combined regional 
and central headquarters) and the bargaining centrality index. 
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With only a few significant relationships occurring between 
measures of organization complexity and relative administrative 
size, there was insufficient basis for accepting the general hypothe¬ 
sis. There apparently is no connection between the complexity of 
unions and the relative size of union administrative components. 
General Hypothesis Three 
As the complexity of the organization increases, the size of 
the organization will increase at a proportionate rate. 
Several significant relationships were obtained between measures 
of organization size and complexity. The number of members, contracts, 
and employers were closely associated (positive correlations) with the 
number of local unions, intermediate bodies, and departments. Weak 
to moderate relationships existed between organization size and 
measures of occupational and industrial diversity (uniformity). Five 
significant correlation values occurred between indicators of size 
and bargaining complexity. However, the relationships were mixed. 
Three associations indicated that larger unions may have developed 
more complex bargaining procedures and two relationships indicated 
that larger unions may have been able to simplify contract bargaining 
procedures. 
Despite these findings, less than half of the computations 
produced significant correlation values between measures of size and 
complexity. Accordingly, the general hypothesis was not accepted. 
There appears to be little or no relationship between union size and 
complexity. 
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General Hypothesis Four 
The Interaction effect of complexity with size will decrease 
the relative size of the administrative component as organization 
size Increases. 
Various combinations of size and complexity indicators were 
inserted into an interaction equation to test this hypothesis. Only 
one equation yielded a significant interaction term. The combined 
effect of the number of locals and the number of members on the 
central headquarters managerial ratio produced a rapidly declining 
curve which flattened out at a relatively low managerial ratio. This 
finding supported the general hypothesis. However, because of the 
lack of other supportive evidence, the hypothesis was not accepted. 
General Implications of the Study 
Several substantive and methodological implications can be 
drawn from the data analysis contained in the previous chapter. The 
substantive issues will be discussed in this section and the methodo¬ 
logical issues (limitations) in the following section. 
There was evidence that some of the working hypotheses may be 
correct statements; however, the preponderance of evidence was 
insufficient to warrant acceptance of any of the general hypotheses. 
Several reasons can be advanced to explain this lack of empirical 
support: (1) a number of other factors may have direct or mediating 
I 
influences on the relative proportion of administrative personnel; 
(2) after a union’s structure becomes established, it may not change 
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significantly even though the union doubles or triples in size; 
(3) even though union jurisdictions vary, unions are similar in 
structure and primary functions and carry out similar activities; 
(4) within many unions, the bulk of administrative employees may be 
attached to the local union rather than located at the regional 
office or the central headquarters; (5) union leaders may lack a 
management (administrative) orientation and place little emphasis 
on developing formal administrative machinery; (6) because of the 
political aspects of union administration, unions may be slow to 
adjust to environmental disturbances (automation, the conglomerate, 
etc.); and (7) the representative aspects of unions may be more 
important than administrative rationality. 
Other Influencing Factors 
The presence and operation of other direct, interacting or 
intervening variables may partially explain the lack of conclusive 
supportive evidence. For example, it may not be large size "as such 
that disposes to bureaucracy; large size may be important only because 
it generates other social forces which, in their turn, generate 
bureaucratic patterns."1 Three sets of factors may be operating to 
complicate the relationships hypothesized in this study. 
The degree of local union autonomy and the locus and scope of 
decision-making within the international union comprise one set of 
conditions. Labor unions can be viewed as political organizations 
which utilize democratic procedures in determining their leaders and 
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approving general policies; consequently, authority is vested in 
the rank and file membership. In most local unions, members and 
officers are engaged in conducting many day-to-day and longer range 
activities of the union. With many activities being performed and 
decisions being made at the local level, there may be less need for 
an elaborate administrative component at the regional office and the 
central headquarters levels. Accordingly, two alternative hypotheses 
might be as follows: (1) The relative size of the administrative 
component (at the regional office and central headquarters) decreases 
as local union autonomy increases. (2) The relative size of the 
administrative component (at the regional office and central head¬ 
quarters) decreases as the number and scope of decisions made at 
the local union level increases. 
Another set of intervening factors revolve around behavioral 
patterns of union members and leaders. The degree of rank and file 
involvement and participation in union activities may be signifi¬ 
cantly related to relative administrative size within unions. A 
proportionately large administrative component may develop in unions 
where members display a very apathetic orientation toward union 
affairs. Where a relatively large number of members are actively 
involved in union activities, the administrative component may be 
considerably smaller. 
The leadership style displayed by the top officials (President 
and Secretary-Treasurer) of the international union may also be 
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connected to relative administrative size. Within two unions of 
equal size, one may contain a significantly larger administrative 
staff because the President displays a very aggressive and dynamic 
approach to solving problems and dealing with employers. A Presi¬ 
dent who continually attempts to increase and diversify the member¬ 
ship, engage in external interests, and significantly improve wages, 
hours, and working conditions may retain a greater number of 
administrative employees than a more reserved President who may be 
more status quo conscious. 
Relative administrative size may also vary according to the 
uniformity or diversity of major union interests. Unions which are 
almost entirely concerned with improving wages, hours, and working 
conditions may not require as large an administrative apparatus as 
unions which are pursuing these and many other (external) interests 
(community affairs, health care, consumer financing, urban 
transportation, foreign trade, etc.). 
Unchanging Character of Union Structure 
As an organization expands and diversifies its activities, it 
may further differentiate its structure both vertically and hori¬ 
zontally. These changes may bring about improved coordination of 
activities, people, and units. Within the labor movement, particu¬ 
larly craft unions, structural forms may not change significantly 
with membership expansion (or decline) because members are employed 
in the same occupation, union leaders become entrenched in their 
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positions, bargaining strategies and tactics do not change, and 
many contract provisions remain intact for relatively long periods 
of time. If relative administrative size is more closely related 
to structural features, fluctuations in membership size will not 
effect the relative number of administrative personnel. 
Similarity of Union Structures and Activities 
Union jurisdictions vary according to geographic area, 
occupation, industry, employer, and work location. The basis of 
jurisdiction partially determines the general structure of a union. 
Unions can be classified into three structural types: craft, indus- 
trial, and general (mixed). Despite differences in jurisdiction and 
structure for collective bargaining representation, most unions have 
developed similar administrative structures (central headquarters, 
regional office, and local union hall) and are engaged in similar 
activities (collective bargaining, organizing new members, political 
education and legislative action). These similarities may explain 
the lack of (systematic) variance among the union administrative 
ratios investigated in this research. 
Local Union Administration 
Many administrative activities are performed within the local 
union by elected officials, full-time administrative employees, and 
members. Locals with several hundred members probably will have 
sufficient funds to support one or more full-time officers and 
administrators. Larger locals (1000 or more members) may even have 
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several full-time staff members. A large local of one of the 
unions included in this study actually had an administrative 
component larger than its parent international union. In addition 
to and possibly interacting with local size, the degree of local 
union autonomy may be associated with relative administrative size 
at the local as well as regional and central office levels. As an 
alternative hypothesis, the greater the degree of local autonomy, 
the larger the proportion of administrative employees at the local 
level and the smaller the proportion of administrators at the 
regional and central offices. 
Lack of Administrative Orientation 
In recent years, applications of many innovative management 
techniques have been developed and adopted by business firms, govern¬ 
ment agencies, educational institutions, hospitals and other non-profit 
organizations. Many of these applications consist of sophisticated 
planning models and control systems. It would be worth asking whether 
unions could benefit from utilizing more advanced (and more formal) 
administrative techniques. There is little evidence available to 
construct an answer to this inquiry. However, one approach would be 
to determine to what extent unions have utilized computers and infor¬ 
mation technology. In a recent book (The Impact of Computers on 
Collective Bargaining),^ descriptions of a few computer collective 
bargaining applications were presented. These applications consisted 
of profiles of organizing drives, computerized contract enforcement 
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procedures, computer hiring of dock workers, a model of health and 
welfare fund financial behavior, and computerized industrial contract 
analyses. Aside from these relatively sophisticated computer appli¬ 
cations, few unions use computers in collective bargaining or for 
expediting internal administrative tasks.^ There may be a substan¬ 
tial gap between what unions are doing and what could be accomplished 
with existing computer equipment and techniques. This may explain 
✓ 
the lack of an association between the proportion of administrative 
personnel and union size and complexity. 
Environmental Disturbances 
"V 
Thompson has suggested that organizations may need to develop 
buffering and filtering devices in order to contend with environmental 
variances.-* These devices may necessitate enlarging an organization's 
administrative component. Because of the relatively centralized 
decision-making process within business organizations, firms can 
probably respond to environmental fluctuations within a short period 
of time. Unions, on the other hand, probably respond more slowly, 
if at all, to external changes because authority to make adjustments 
is vested in the membership. This authority is exercised through 
various democratic procedures. In many instances, union members may 
be very reluctant to approve dues increases to finance the expansion 
of various administrative groups. 
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Representation Versus Administration 
An implication which encompasses the other results explanations 
concerns the relative importance of the administrative and repre¬ 
sentative aspects of union organization. As a representative 
organization, the union emphasizes member involvement, local unit 
autonomy, group (consensus) decision making, all channel communica¬ 
tion networks, and membership control. Administrative rationality 
involves a hierarchy of full time administrative positions, central¬ 
ized authority, a unified control system, vertical communications, 
individual decision making, and specialization. These two models of 
union organization may conflict at times within a union; however, 
they do exist and function concurrently. Accordingly, two alternate 
hypotheses might be as follows: (1) The relative size of the admini¬ 
strative component (at the regional office and central headquarters) 
decreases as more emphasis is placed on effective member representa¬ 
tion and less emphasis is devoted to developing a rational 
administrative system. (2) The relative size of the administrative 
component (at the regional office and central headquarters) increases 
as more emphasis is placed on administrative rationality and less 
emphasis is placed on member representation. 
Limitations of the Study 
Although there was an attempt to control which unions would 
participate in the study, a union's willingness to participate and 
its accessibility became the most important selection criteria for 
164 
inclusion in the sample. Consequently, it must be asserted that 
the sample was not randomly drawn and was not representative of all 
national and international unions with 10,000 members or more. 
The size of the sample was another limiting factor. When 
sample sizes are small (under 30), the observations may not be 
normally distributed; a _t distribution should therefore be used. 
As samples become larger (30 and over), the difference between the 
t. and normal distributions diminishes and the normal distribution 
£ 
can be used. A sample of 30 is obviously a borderline case; however, 
the observations were assumed to be normally distributed. 
Other methodological limitations stem from the use of interview 
and survey research techniques. The use of a structured questionnaire 
and interview format does minimize the possibility of respondent's 
misinterpretation of the question posed, but due to differences in 
word meanings and terminology, correct (or adequate) responses may not 
be offered. Additionally, individuals in different union positions 
were interviewed. This may have produced some incorrect responses 
(or estimates) because the individual may not have been the most 
knowledgeable person to respond to a particular question. 
Operational measurements of the independent and dependent 
variables may also have contributed to the lack of supportive evidence 
for the general hypotheses. Organization size and complexity and 
relative administrative size are multi-dimensional concepts. Accord¬ 
ingly, measures of each variable were developed and used. However, 
many of these operational definitions may not have adequately 
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reflected the characteristics of the general variables; the 
operational definitions were not valid indicators. For example, 
relative administrative size might have been more accurately measured 
by indications of the quantity and quality of union administrative 
problems. 
A final limitation concerns the basic research strategy 
followed in the study. The comparative approach was utilized and 
consisted of a cross-sectional analysis of one type of organization. 
The analysis of data gathered at one point in time does not yield any 
indication of the time ordering of variables; therefore, no causal 
inferences or variable sequences can be determined. Only concurrent 
relationships become identifiable. For example, increases in organi¬ 
zation size may precede other factors such as increases in structural 
differentiation. An association derived from a cross-sectional 
analysis would not reveal this lag relationship. A more appropriate 
research strategy would have been to gather data from several points 
in time and constructed a longitudinal analysis. 
Future Research 
Several questions are raised from this study which might be 
examined in future research. Utilizing various research techniques, 
the following research recommendations involve or are related to 
examinations of relative administrative size in labor unions. 
In an earlier section of this chapter, several variables, not 
researched in this study, were identified as possible determinants 
or correlates of relative administrative size. Many of these factors 
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involve the local union. The present study could be replicated 
using a sample of local unions from one or several international 
unions. The same general dependent and independent variables would 
be examined, but operational definitions of these variables might be 
changed to reflect the characteristics of this level within the 
union hierarchy. An additional general independent factor to be 
investigated would be the degree of local union autonomy. 
A longitudinal (case) study on the development of administration 
in two or more unions might be attempted in order to determine a 
causal sequence of variables affecting the relative size of the 
administrative component. A study of this nature would be helpful in 
identifying union growth patterns and developmental stages of admini¬ 
stration. This study might focus on the ways in which administrative 
activities become formalized through programs, standardized proced¬ 
ures, and written reports. In addition, the extent to which unions 
have developed and used more formalized (and sophisticated) planning 
models, co-ordinating mechanisms, and control techniques could be 
researched. 
Although the complexity and structure of collective bargaining 
was not consistently associated with relative administrative size, it 
would be fruitful to further explore this connection. Collective 
bargaining is a major activity of labor unions and it would appear 
that bargaining strategy and tactics as well as other collective bar¬ 
gaining activities have an impact on the development of union 
administration. An in-depth analysis of a few unions or a survey of 
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many unions could be conducted to identify the relationship(s) 
between the structure and complexity of collective bargaining and 
union administration. 
Another avenue of research would be to use a contingency (open 
systems) view of administration to determine the extent to which 
industry, technological, legal, labor market, and political variables 
affect the administrative process within unions. Such a study would 
involve an attempt to identify those environmental characteristics 
which strongly affect the relative size of the administrative 
component. 
Finally, several research projects (case studies) could be 
directed toward determining the impact of certain behavioral factors 
(leadership style, membership apathy, and leadership succession) on 
relative administrative size. This research program would involve 
measuring member participation and interest in local and international 
union activities and top union officials' concern for meeting the 
needs of members and preserving the organization. 
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APPENDIX A 
FIELD QUESTIONNAIRE AND DATA SHEET 
Administrative Staff: 
1. Number of full-time administrative employees at national or 
international headquarters in the following groups: 
(a) Managers and administrators (elected officials 
and administrative assistants of these officials) _ 
(b) Professionals (research, education, organizing 
directors, etc.) _ 
(c) Organizers and representatives _ 
(d) Clerical and secretarial _ 
(e) Others (specify) 
2. Number of full-time administrative employees at regional or 
district offices in the following groups: 
(a) Managers and administrators _ 
(b) Professionals _ 
(c) Organizers and representatives _ 
(d) Clerical and secretarial _ 
(e) Others (specify) _ 
3. Are the following functional departments located at the central 





(c) Welfare, Health and Community 
(d) Legal 
(e) Social Insurance 
(f) Legislative 
(g) Organizing 
(h) Public Relations 
(i) Secretary-Treasurer 
(j) Research 
(k) Other (specify) 
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Intermediate Bodies and Locals: 
4. Number of regions or districts _ 
5. Number of other intermediate bodies (local, state, trade, 
or employer councils) _ 
6. Number of locals 
Elected or Appointed Administrative Employees: 
7. Number of elected and appointed administrative employees at 
regional and national levels: 
Regional National 
(a) Elected _ _ 
(b) Appointed   
8. Regional elective procedures (regional director): 
(a) Appointed _ 
(b) Elected at large  
(c) Elected in convention caucus _ 
(d) Elected by district or region  
(e) Elected by delegate body _ 
Membership: 
9. Annual average dues-paying membership count for 1970 _ 
10. Occupational composition. Approximate percentage in each 
category: 
(a) Technical _ 
(b) Clerical  
(c) Sales _ 
(d) Professional  
(e) Craftsmen _ 
(f) Service  
(g) Operatives (Production and maintenance)_ 
11. Industry composition of union membership. Approximate per¬ 
centage in each group: 
Per cent 
Manufacturing (durables) 
(a) Ordnance and accessories 
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(b) Lumber and wood products 
(c) Furniture and fixtures 
(d) Stone, clay, glass, and concrete 
(e) Primary metal industries 
(f) Fabricated metal products 
(g) Machinery 
(h) Electrical machinery and supplies 
(i) Transportation equipment 
(j) Instrument and related products 
Manufacturing (nondurables) 
(a) Food and Kindred products 
(b) Tobacco 
(c) Textile 
(d) Apparel and other products 
(e) Paper and allied products 
(f) Petroleum 
(g) Printing 
(h) Rubber and plastics 
(i) Chemicals and allied products 
(j) Leather and leather products 
Government 
(a) Federal 
(b) State and local 
Collective Bargaining: 
12. Number of basic collective bargaining agreements with 
employers _ 
13. Number of different employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements _ 
14. Approximate percentage of contracts negotiated in each of the 
following bargaining procedures: 
Per cent of 
Contracts 
(a) Contracts are negotiated almost 
entirely on an industry or national 
(multiemployer) basis. 
APPENDIX A--continued 
Major sections of contracts are 
negotiated on an industry or 
national (multiemployer) basis 
with some provisions negotiated 
at the local union level. 
Major sections of contracts are 
negotiated on a regional, district, 
or conference (multiemployer) basis 
with some provisions negotiated at 
the local union level. 
Major sections of contracts are 
negotiated on a company-wide 
(single-employer) basis with some 
provisions negotiated at the 
local union level. 
Contracts are negotiated primarily 
at the local union level with a 
few provisions being negotiated on 
a company-wide (single-employer) 
basis. 
Contracts are negotiated entirely 
by each local union. 
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Organization Size 
Combined (heterogeneous) Administrative Ratios 
(1) As the number of union members increases, the relative 
size of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at 
central headquarters and regional offices will decrease at a constant 
rate. 
(2) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
relative size of the administrative component (all administrative 
groups) at central headquarters and regional offices will decrease at 
a constant rate. 
(3) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increases, 
the relative size of the administrative component (all administrative 
groups) at central headquarters and regional offices will decrease at 
a constant rate. 
(4) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the relative size of the administrative compo¬ 
nent (all administrative groups) at central headquarters and regional 
offices will decrease at a constant rate. 
(5) As the number of union members increases, the relative size 
of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at the 
central headquarters will decrease at a constant rate. 
(6) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
relative size of the administrative component (all administrative 
groups) at the central headquarters will decrease at a constant rate. 
(7) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increases, 
the relative size of the administrative component (all administrative 
groups) at the central headquarters will decrease at a constant rate. 
(8) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the relative size of the administrative compo¬ 
nent (all administrative groups) at the central headquarters will 
decrease at a constant rate. 
(9) As the number of union members increases, the relative size 
of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at 
regional offices will decrease at a constant rate. 
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(10) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
relative size of the administrative component (all administrative 
groups) at regional offices will decrease at a constant rate. 
(11) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increa¬ 
ses, the relative size of the administrative component (all admini¬ 
strative groups) at regional offices will decrease at a constant 
rate. 
(12) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the relative size of the administrative compo¬ 
nent (all administrative groups) at regional offices will decrease 
at a constant rate. 
Managerial Ratios 
(1) As the number of union members increases, the relative size 
of the managerial component at central headquarters and regional 
offices will decrease at a constant rate. 
(2) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
relative size of the managerial component at central headquarters and 
regional offices will decrease at a constant rate. 
(3) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increases, 
the relative size of the managerial component at central headquarters 
and regional offices will decrease at a constant rate. 
(4) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the relative size of the managerial component 
at central headquarters and regional offices will decrease at a 
constant rate. 
(5) As the number of union members increases, the relative size 
of the managerial component at the central headquarters will decrease 
at a constant rate. 
(6) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
relative size of the managerial component at the central headquarters 
will decrease at a constant rate. 
(7) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increases, 
the relative size of the managerial component at the central head¬ 
quarters will decrease at a constant rate. 
188 
APPENDIX B--continued 
(8) As the number of employers covered by collective bargain¬ 
ing agreements increases, the relative size of the managerial 
component at the central headquarters will decrease at a constant 
rate. 
(9) As the number of union members increases, the relative 
size of the managerial component at regional offices will decrease 
at a constant rate. 
(10) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
relative size of the managerial ratio at regional offices will 
decrease at a constant rate. 
(11) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increa¬ 
ses, the relative size of the managerial component at regional 
offices will decrease at a constant rate. 
(12) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the relative size of the managerial component 
at regional offices will decrease at a constant rate. 
Professional Staff Ratios 
(1) As the number of union members increases, the relative size 
of the professional staff component at central headquarters and 
regional offices will decrease at a constant rate. 
(2) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
relative size of the professional staff component at central head¬ 
quarters and regional offices will decrease at a constant rate. 
(3) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increases, 
the relative size of the professional staff component at central head¬ 
quarters and regional offices will decrease at a constant rate. 
(4) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the relative size of the professional staff 
component at central headquarters and regional offices will decrease 
at a constant rate. 
(5) As the number of union members increases, the relative size 
of the professional staff component at the central headquarters will 
decrease at a constant rate. 
(6) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
relative size of the professional staff component at the central 
headquarters will decrease at a constant rate. 
APPENDIX B--continued 
(7) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increa¬ 
ses, the relative size of the professional staff component at the 
central headquarters will decrease at a constant rate. 
(8) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the relative size of the professional staff 
component at the central headquarters will decrease at a constant 
rate. 
(9) As the number of union members increases, the relative size 
of the professional staff component at regional offices will decrease 
at a constant rate. 
(10) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
relative size of the professional staff component at regional offices 
will decrease at a constant rate. 
(11) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increa¬ 
ses, the relative size of the professional staff component at 
regional offices will decrease at a constant rate. 
(12) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the relative size of the professional staff 
component at regional offices will decrease at a constant rate. 
Organizer and Representative Ratios 
(1) As the number of union members increases, the relative size 
of the organizer and representative component at central headquarters 
and regional offices will decrease at a constant rate. 
(2) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
relative size of the organizer and representative component at cen¬ 
tral headquarters and regional offices will decrease at a constant 
rate. 
(3) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increa¬ 
ses, the relative size of the organizer and representative component 
at central headquarters and regional offices will decrease at a 
constant rate. 
(4) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the relative size of the organizer and repre¬ 
sentative component at central headquarters and regional offices will 
decrease at a constant rate. 
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(5) As the number of union members increases, the relative 
size of the organizer and representative component at the central 
headquarters will decrease at a constant rate. 
(6) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
relative size of the organizer and representative component at the 
central headquarters will decrease at a constant rate. 
(7) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increases, 
the relative size of the organizer and representative component at 
the central headquarters will decrease at a constant rate. 
(8) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the relative size of the organizer and repre¬ 
sentative component at the central headquarters will decrease at a 
constant rate. 
(9) As the number of union members, increases, the relative size 
of the organizer and representative component at regional offices 
will decrease at a constant rate. 
(10) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
relative size of the organizer and representative component at 
regional offices will decrease at a constant rate. 
(11) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increases, 
the relative size of the organizer and representative component at 
regional offices will decrease at a constant rate. 
(12) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the relative size of the organizer and repre¬ 
sentative component at regional offices will decrease at a constant 
rate. 
Clerical Ratios 
(1) As the number of union members increases, the relative size 
of the clerical component at central headquarters and regional offices 
will decrease at a constant rate. 
(2) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
relative size of the clerical component at central headquarters and 
regional offices will decrease at a constant rate. 
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(3) As the number of collective bargaining agreements 
increases, the relative size of the clerical component at central 
headquarters and regional offices will decrease at a constant rate. 
(4) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the relative size of the clerical component at 
central headquarters and regional offices will decrease at a constant 
rate. 
(5) As the number of union members increases, the relative size 
of the clerical component at the central headquarters will decrease 
at a constant rate. 
(6) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
relative size of the clerical component at the central headquarters 
will decrease at a constant rate. 
. (7) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increases, 
the relative size of the clerical component at the central head¬ 
quarters will decrease at a constant rate. 
(8) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the relative size of the clerical component at 
the central headquarters will decrease at a constant rate. 
(9) As the number of union members increases, the relative size 
of the clerical component at regional offices will decrease at a 
constant rate. 
(10) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
relative size of the clerical component at regional offices will 
decrease at a constant rate. 
(11) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increases, 
the relative size of the clerical component at regional offices will 
decrease at a constant rate. 
(12) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the relative size of the clerical component at 




Combined (heterogeneous) Administrative Ratios 
(1) As the number of local unions increases, the relative size 
of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at 
central headquarters and regional offices will increase proportion¬ 
ately. 
(2) As the number of intermediate bodies increases, the 
relative size of the administrative component (all administrative 
groups) at central headquarters and regional offices will increase 
proportionately. 
(3) As the number of technical and administrative departments 
at central headquarters increases, the relative size of the admini¬ 
strative component (all administrative groups) at central head¬ 
quarters and regional offices will increase proportionately. 
(4) As the occupational diversity of the membership increases, 
the relative size of the administrative component (all administrative 
groups) at central headquarters and regional offices will increase 
at a constant rate. 
(5) As the industrial diversity of the membership increases, 
the relative size of the administrative component (all administrative 
groups) at central headquarters and regional offices will increase 
at a constant rate. 
(6) As the contracts/locals ratio decreases, the relative size 
of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at cen¬ 
tral headquarters and regional offices will increase at a constant 
rate. 
(7) As the contracts/employers ratio decreases, the relative 
size of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at 
central headquarters and regional offices will increase at a constant 
rate. 
(8) As the employers/locals ratio increases, the relative size 
of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at cen¬ 
tral headquarters and regional offices will increase at a constant 
rate. 
(9) As the centralization of contract negotiations increases, 
the relative size of the administrative component (all administrative 
groups) at central headquarters and regional offices will increase at 
a constant rate. 
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(10) As the number of local unions increases, the relative size 
of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at the 
central headquarters will increase proportionately. 
(11) As the number of intermediate bodies increases, the 
relative size of the administrative component (all administrative 
groups) at the central headquarters will increase proportionately. 
(12) As the number of technical and administrative departments 
at central headquarters increases, the relative size of the admini¬ 
strative component (all administrative groups) at the central head¬ 
quarters will increase proportionately. 
(13) As the occupational diversity of the membership increases, 
the relative size of the administrative component (all administra¬ 
tive groups) at the central headquarters will increase at a constant 
rate. 
(14) As the industrial diversity of the membership increases, 
the relative size of the administrative component (all administrative 
groups) at the central headquarters will increase at a constant rate. 
(15) As the contracts/locals ratio decreases, the relative size 
of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at the 
central headquarters will increase at a constant rate. 
(16) As the contracts/employers ratio decreases, the relative 
size of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at 
the central headquarters will increase at a constant rate. 
(17) As the employers/locals ratio increases, the relative size 
of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at the 
central headquarters will increase at a constant rate. 
(18) As the centralization of contract negotiations increases, 
the relative size of the administrative component (all administrative 
groups) at the central headquarters will increase at a constant rate. 
(19) As the number of local unions increases, the relative size 
of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at 
regional offices will increase proportionately. 
(20) As the number of intermediate bodies increases, the rela¬ 
tive size of the administrative component (all administrative groups) 
at regional offices will increase proportionately. 
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(21) As the number of technical and administrative departments 
at central headquarters increases, the relative size of the admini¬ 
strative component (all groups) at regional offices will increase 
proportionately. 
(22) As the occupational diversity of the membership increases, 
the relative size of the administrative component (all administrative 
groups) at regional offices will increase at a constant rate. 
(23) As the industrial diversity of the membership increases, 
the relative size of the administrative component (all administrative 
groups) at regional offices will increase at a constant rate. 
(24) As the contracts/locals ratio decreases, the relative size 
of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at 
regional offices will increase at a constant rate. 
(25) As the contracts/employers ratio decreases, the relative 
size of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at 
regional offices will increase at a constant rate. 
(26) As the employers/locals ratio increases, the relative size 
of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at 
regional offices will increase at a constant rate. 
(27) As the centralization of contract negotiations increases, 
the relative size of the administrative component (all administrative 
groups) at regional offices will increase at a constant rate. 
There are 135 complexity-relative administrative size working 
hypotheses. Because these hypotheses are stated much like the size- 
relative administrative size hypotheses (the difference being the 
independent variable), only the first of the five groups is presented 
in the appendix. The five groups consist of (1) a heterogeneous 
administrative category, (2) managers and administrators, (3) profes¬ 
sional staff personnel, (4) organizers and representatives, and 
(5) clerical workers. 
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Organization Size and Complexity Interaction 
Size--Number of Union Members 
» 
(1) As the number of union members increases, the number of 
local unions will increase at a proportionate rate. 
(2) As the number of union members increases, the number of 
intermediate bodies will increase at a proportionate rate. 
(3) As the number of union members increases, the number of 
technical and administrative departments will increase at a 
proportionate rate. 
(4) As the number of union members increases, the occupational 
diversity of the membership will increase at a proportionate rate. 
(5) As the number of union members increases, the industrial 
diversity of the membership will increase at a proportionate rate. 
(6) As the number of union members increases, the contracts/ 
locals ratio will decrease at a proportionate rate. 
(7) As the number of union members increases, the contracts/ 
employers ratio will decrease at a proportionate rate. 
(8) As the number of union members increases, the employers/ 
locals ratio will increase at a proportionate rate. 
(9) As the number of union members increases, the centraliza¬ 
tion of contract negotiations will increase at a proportionate rate. 
Size--Average Local Size 
(1) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
number of local unions will increase at a proportionate rate. 
(2) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
number of intermediate bodies will increase at a proportionate rate. 
(3) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
number of technical and administrative departments will increase at 
a proportionate rate. 
(4) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 




(5) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
industrial diversity of the membership will increase at a propor¬ 
tionate rate. 
(6) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
contracts/locals ratio will decrease at a proportionate rate. 
(7) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
contracts/employers ratio will decrease at a proportionate rate. 
(8) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
employers/locals ratio will increase at a proportionate rate. 
(9) As average local size (average membership) increases, the 
centralization of contract negotiations will increase at a propor¬ 
tionate rate. 
Size--Number of Collective Bargaining Agreements 
(1) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increases, 
the number of local unions will increase at a proportionate rate. 
(2) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increases, 
the number of intermediate bodies will increase at a proportionate 
rate. 
(3) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increases, 
the number of technical and administrative departments will increase 
at a proportionate rate. 
(4) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increases, 
the occupational diversity of the membership will increase at a 
proportionate rate. 
(5) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increases, 
the industrial diversity of the membership will increase at a pro¬ 
portionate rate. 
(6) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increases, 
the contracts/locals ratio will decrease at a proportionate rate. 
(7) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increases, 
the contracts/employers ratio will decrease at a proportionate rate. 
(8) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increases, 
the employers/locals ratio will increase at proportionate rate. 
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(9) As the number of collective bargaining agreements increases, 
the centralization of contract negotiations will increase at a pro¬ 
portionate rate. 
Size--Number of Employers 
(1) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the number of local unions will increase at a 
proportionate rate. 
(2) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the number of intermediate bodies will increase 
at a proportionate rate. 
(3) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the number of technical and administrative 
departments will.increase at a proportionate rate. 
(4) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the occupational diversity of the membership 
will increase at a proportionate rate. 
(5) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the industrial diversity of the membership will 
increase at a proportionate rate. 
(6) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the contracts/locals ratio will decrease at a 
proportionate rate. 
(7) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the contracts/employers ratio will decrease at 
a proportionate rate. 
(8) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the employers/locals ratio will increase at a 
proportionate rate. 
(9) As the number of employers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements increases, the centralization of contract negotiations 
will increase at a proportionate rate. 
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Size-Complexity Interaction with Relative 
Administrative Size 
Combined (heterogeneous) Administrative Ratios 
(1) The interaction effect of the number of local unions with 
the number of union members will decrease the relative size of the 
administrative component (all administrative groups) at central 
headquarters and regional offices as the number of union members 
increases. 
(2) The interaction effect of the number of intermediate bodies 
with the number of union members will decrease the relative size of 
the administrative component (all administrative groups) at central 
headquarters and regional offices as the number of union members 
increases. 
(3) The interaction effect of the number of technical and 
administrative departments (at central headquarters) with the number 
of union members will decrease the relative size of the administrative 
component (all administrative groups) at central headquarters and 
regional offices as the number of union members increases. 
(4) The interaction effect of the occupational diversity of the 
membership with the number of union members will decrease the relative 
size of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at 
central headquarters and regional offices as the number of union 
members increases. 
(5) The interaction effect of the industrial diversity of the 
membership with the number of union members will decrease the relative 
size of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at 
central headquarters and regional offices as the number of union 
members increases. 
(6) The interaction effect of the contracts/locals ratio with 
the number of union members will decrease the relative size of the 
administrative component (all administrative groups) at central 
headquarters and regional offices as the number of union members 
increases. 
(7) The interaction effect of the contracts/employers ratio 
with the number of union members will decrease the relative size of 
the administrative component (all administrative groups) at central 




(8) The interaction effect of the employers/locals ratio with 
the number of union members will decrease the relative size of the 
administrative component (all administrative groups) at central 
headquarters and regional offices as the number of union members 
increases. 
(9) The interaction effect of centralization of contract nego¬ 
tiations with the number of union members will decrease the relative 
size of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at 
central headquarters and regional offices as the number of union 
members increases. 
(10) The interaction effect of the number of local unions with 
the number of union members will decrease the relative size of the 
administrative component (all administrative groups) at the central 
headquarters as the number of union members increases. 
(11) The interaction effect of the number of intermediate bodies 
with the number of union members will decrease the relative size of 
the administrative component (all administrative groups) at the 
central headquarters as the number of union members increases. 
(12) The interaction effect of the number of technical and 
administrative departments (at central headquarters) with the number 
of union members will decrease the relative size of the administra¬ 
tive component (all administrative groups) at the central headquarters 
as the number of union members increases. 
(13) The interaction effect of the occupational diversity of the 
membership with the number of union members will decrease the relative 
size of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at 
the central headquarters as the number of union members increases. 
(14) The interaction effect of the industrial diversity of the 
membership with the number of union members will decrease the relative 
size of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at 
the central headquarters as the number of union members increases. 
(15) The interaction effect of the contracts/locals ratio with 
the number of union members will decrease the relative size of the 
administrative component (all administrative groups) at the central 
headquarters as the number of union members increases. 
(16) The interaction effect of the contracts/employers ratio 
with the number of union members will decrease the relative size of 
the administrative component (all administrative groups) at central 
headquarters as the number of union members increases. 
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(17) The interaction effect of the employers/locals ratio with 
the number of union members will decrease the relative size of the 
administrative component (all administrative groups) at the central 
headquarters as the number of union members increases. 
(18) The interaction effect of centralization of contract nego¬ 
tiations with the number of union members will decrease the relative 
size of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at 
the central headquarters as the number of union members increases. 
(19) The interaction effect of the number of local unions with 
the number of union members will decrease the relative size of the 
administrative component (all administrative groups) at regional 
offices as the number of union members increases. 
(20) The interaction effect of the number of intermediate bodies 
with the number of union members will decrease the relative size of 
the administrative component (all administrative groups) at regional 
offices as the number of union members increases. 
(21) The interaction effect of the number of technical and 
administrative departments (at central headquarters) with the number 
of union members will decrease the relative size of the administra¬ 
tive component (all administrative groups) at regional offices as 
the number of union members increases. 
(22) The interaction effect of the occupational diversity of the 
membership with the number of union members will decrease the 
relative size of the administrative component (all administrative 
groups) at regional offices as the number of union members increases. 
(23) The interaction effect of the industrial diversity of the 
membership with the number of union members will decrease the rela¬ 
tive size of the administrative component (all administrative groups) 
at regional offices as the number of union members increases. 
(24) The interaction effect of the contracts/locals ratio with 
the number of union members will decrease the relative size of the 
administrative component (all administrative groups) at regional 
offices as the number of union members increases. 
(25) The interaction effect of the contracts/employers ratio 
with the number of union members will decrease the relative size of 
the administrative component (all administrative groups) at regional 
offices as the number of union members increases. 
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(26) The interaction effect of the employers/locals ratio with 
the number of union members will decrease the relative size of the 
administrative component (all administrative groups) at regional 
offices as the number of union members increases. 
(27) The interaction effect of centralization of contract nego¬ 
tiations with the number of union members will decrease the relative 
size of the administrative component (all administrative groups) at 
regional offices as the number of union members increases. 
There are 540 size-complexity interaction working hypotheses. 
Because these hypothese are stated much like those above (the 
difference being the independent variable), only the first of four 
subgroups of the first of five major groups is presented in the 
appendix. The subgroups consist of (1) number of members--complexity 
interaction, (2) average local size--complexity interaction, 
(3) number of collective bargaining agreements—complexity inter¬ 
action, and (4) number of employers--complexity interaction. The 
five major groups consist of (1) a hetergeneous administrative cate¬ 
gory, (2) managers and administrators, (3) professional staff 
personnel, (4) organizers and representatives, and (5) clerical 
workers. 
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LETTER REQUESTING PARTICIPATION IN THE STUDY 
Dear Sir: 
In cooperation with the Labor Relations and Research Center, 
I am investigating the factors which affect the relative size of 
administrative staff in national and international labor unions. 
In this study, administrative staff is defined as union personnel 
who are primarily oriented to and perform decision-making, control, 
and service activities. These would include: managers and 
administrators, clerical and secretarial, organizers and repre¬ 
sentatives, and professional staff. 
I am seeking your cooperation. The information for this study 
will be gathered through a personal interview with you or some 
other union official at your headquarters. The interview will take 
approximately an hour and one half. Since the information required 
is quantitative in nature, you may need to refer to various union 
records. 
During the first three weeks of January, 1972, I plan to 
conduct 30 to 40 interviews. I would appreciate your assistance 
in this project. If you are willing to participate in the study 
and will be available for an interview during the first part of 
January, please indicate this at the bottom of the letter. If not, 
make the appropriate indication. In either case, please return 
this letter in the stamped, self-addressed envelope provided. If 
you are willing to help, I will contact you later to arrange a date 
for the interview. 
This study will serve to fulfill the research required for 
the degree of Ph.D. in Industrial Relations at the University of 
Massachusetts. Professor Harvey Friedman, Director of the Labor 
Relations and Research Center, is assisting me in data collection. 
If you have any questions, please contact Professor Friedman or 
myself. 
Very truly yours. 
David A. Gray 
I will participate I will not participate 
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FIRST FOLLOW-UP TO LETTER 
REQUESTING PARTICIPATION 
Dear Sir: 
Two weeks ago, you received a letter requesting cooperation 
in a study of the factors which affect the relative size of 
administrative staff in national and international labor unions. 
I have not received a response from you indicating either your 
willingness or unwillingness to participate in this project. 
The information for this study will be gathered through a 
personal interview with you or some other union official at your 
international headquarters. The interview will take no longer 
than an hour and one half. I would appreciate your assistance. 
If you are willing to participate in the study, please indicate 
this at the bottom of the letter. If not, make the appropriate 
indication. In either case, return the letter in the stamped, 
self-addressed envelope provided in the first letter. You will 
be contacted later to arrange a January date for the interview 
if you have decided to participate. 
This study will serve to fulfill the research required for 
the degree of Ph.D. in Industrial Relations at the University of 
Massachusetts. Professor Harvey Friedman, Director of the Labor 
Relations and Research Center, is assisting me in data collection. 
If you desire additional information or clarification, please 
contact Professor Friedman or myself. 
Very truly yours, 
David A. Gray 
I will participate I will not participate 
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SECOND FOLLOW-UP TO LETTER 
REQUESTING PARTICIPATION 
Dear Sir: 
On two occasions during the past four weeks you received a 
letter requesting cooperation in a study of the factors which affect 
the relative size of administrative staff in national and inter¬ 
national labor unions. Again I am asking for your assistance in 
this research project. Since I am planning to statistically analyze 
the data, the information from each union adds significantly to the 
value of the study. To date, 25 unions have agreed to participate; 
a sample of at least 30 unions is required. 
The information for this study will be gathered through a 
personal interview with you or some other union official at your 
international headquarters. The interview will take no longer than 
an hour and one half. All information will be held in strict con¬ 
fidence and only aggregate data will be analyzed. If you are 
willing to participate in the study, please indicate this at the 
bottom of the letter. If not, make the appropriate indication. 
In either case, return the letter in the stamped, self-addressed 
envelope provided in the first letter. You will be contacted 
later to arrange a January date for the interview if you have 
decided to participate. 
This study will serve to fulfill the research required for 
the degree of Ph.D. in Industrial Relations at the University of 
Massachusetts. Professor Harvey Friedman, Director of the Labor 
Relations and Research Center, is assisting me in data collection. 
If you desire additional information or clarification, please 
contact Professor Friedman or myself. 
Very truly yours, 
David A. Gray 
I will participate I will not participate 
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APPOINTMENT LETTER TO 
PARTICIPATING UNIONS 
Dear Sir: 
Recently I received a response from you indicating your 
willingness to participate in a study of the factors which affect 
the relative size of administrative staff in national and inter¬ 
national labor unions. Your assistance is greatly appreciated. 
As I indicated in the previous letter, the information for 
this study will be gathered through a personal interview with you 
at your international headquarters. I would like to tentatively 
schedule this interview for January XX, 1972. I will contact you 
by phone a day or two before this date to arrange a specific time. 
If this date is not satisfactory, an alternate can be arranged 
since I will be in Washington, D. C. from January 5 through 14. 
I will be staying at the Manger Hamilton Hotel, 14th and K Streets, 
N. W. (202) 347-2580. 
Thank you for your interest and cooperation. I am looking 
forward to talking with you. 
Very truly yours, 
David A. Gray 
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ADMINISTRATIVE CATEGORIES--REGION 
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